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NOTICE, COSTS, AND THE EFFECT OF JUDGMENT IN

MISSOURI'S NEW COMMON-QUESTION CLASS ACTION
WILLIAm B. Fisci*
I. INTRODUCrION

On December 1, 1972, the Missouri Supreme Court greatly expanded
the potential usefulness of the class action device in our state courts by
adopting the most recent version of the federal class action rule.' The
4Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; A.B. Harvard
College, 1957; LL.B. University of Illinois, 1960; M. Comp. L. University of Chicago, 1962.
1. Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08. The provisions of this rule and FED. R. Clv. P. 23 are
identical; subdivision designations are parallel. Hereinafter, footnote citations to
the class action rule may be by subdivision designation only. The text of Mo. R.
Civ. P. 52.08 and FED. R. Civ. P. 23 is as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims
or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in
addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
individual members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate

final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
(173)
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single most significant change brought about by this amendment-beyond
reformulation of the general criteria for the availability of the device-.
is the sanctioning of the class action where a group of persons is related
to one another solely by virtue of having claims or defenses involving
common questions of law or fact. Under the original federal rule, this
variant was dubbed by its draftsman, Professor Moore, the "spurious" class
action, to reflect the fact that a judgment in this type-unlike the others
called "true" and "hybrid"-would not bind members of the class who
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually

controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the

controversy already commenced by or against members of the
class;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be MaintainedNotice-Judgment-Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether
it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on
the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment,
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion
may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and describe those whom the court finds to
be members of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as
a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not
requested exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the
class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class
may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and
the provisions of this Rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this Rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders:
(1)determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requinng, for the protection of
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct
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were not formally joined as individuals.2 For this reason, class-action treatment was unavailable in such cases in Missouri state courts, even after
adoption in 19433 of the federal class action rule (including the commonquestion or "spurious" category), because the Missouri Supreme Court
added a prohibition against class actions where the judgment would not
bind all members of the class.' Because the 1966 version of the federal
rule makes the judgment purport to bind absent members of the class
who are specified or described in the judgment, the prohibition in the
state rule appeared to be superfluous and was dropped.
In order to accomplish this extension of res judicata effect in common-

question class actions, however, the draftsmen of the new federal rule considered it necessary to pay a substantial price in added criteria and administrative requirements. Two special prerequisites, applicable only to
common-question cases, are laid down in the rule: (I) The common questions of law or fact must predominate over those individual to the members,r and (2) the court must find that the class action device is superior
to other means of adjudication. 6 The federal advisory committee intended
these to ensure that judicial economy-the raison d'6tre of the commonquestion class actionT-would be served, In addition, the rule requires
to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or othervise to come into
the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under Rule 62, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable
from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
2. See 8B J. MooRE, FER.AL PacrricE . 23.10 (I) (2d ed. 1969). The
terminology is attributed by most writers originally to T. STREET, FEDERAL

EQurrY

PRAcarcz § 548, at 342 (1909). See Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur,
33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 328 (1948).

3. Mo. Laws 1943, at 362, § 19.
4. Mo. R. Crv. P. 52.09 (d), RSMo 1969: "No class suit shall be maintained
under Rule 52.08 unless the judgment or decree will be binding upon all members
of the class." This provision was first adopted in 1944 as Supreme Court Rule
3.07 (d), supplementing the Civil Code of 194-3 (see, e.g., Crawford, Class Actions
under the Missouri Code, 18 U.K.C.L. Rxv. 103, 114 (1950)), and then incorporated
into the Rules of Civil Procedure in the 1960 Revision.
5. Subdivision (b)(3).
6. Id.
7. PROP. FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102-03
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note] states:
Subdivision (bX3). In the situations to which this subdivision relates, dassaction treatment is not as dearly called for as in those described above,
but it may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending upon the
HeinOnline -- 38 Mo. L. Rev. 175 1973
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(1) that notice must be given at an early stage of such actions to absent
members of the class, 9 and (2) that absent members be given the opportunity to appear through an attorney or to remove themselves from the
class without regard to reasons ("opt out"). 0 The draftsmen considered
these procedural safeguards essential to satisfy the demands of due process."1
In the six-year experience of the federal courts under the new rule,
the most troublesome of these additional requirements and procedural safeguards has been that of notice, along with the special privileges given to
the absent members. A host of practical and theoretical problems, many
of which are not dearly answered by the rule, have surfaced. Why is
pretrial notice mandatory only in common-question class actions? Why
are absent members of such classes given the privilege of "opting out"?
Can the rule's requirement of individual notice to all persons who can
be identified with relative ease be relaxed in particular cases, where the
cost of such notice is too great? If so, what will be the effect of any
judgment rendered? Will an absent member not otherwise within the
court's personal jurisdiction be bound by the alternatives given in the
notice, or can he ignore the notice as he might ignore a civil summons?
By whom should the notice be sent, and who is to bear the cost of sending
it-the representative, the opponent, or the court? When must the notice
be sent: is there room for delay until some preliminary matters, such as
discovery, have been completed?
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court bearing on these questions are extremely scarce and of uncertain import. For the most part the
Court-both as rule-maker and as appellate decision-maker-has left the
lower courts to their own devices. They have not reached uniform results.
No doubt this was expected and desired, to the extent that the problems
are highly specific to the particular case, and are better regulated by a
casuistic approach. On the other hand, some mandatory features of the
particular facts. Subdivision (b) (3) encompasses those cases in which a
class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without

sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
8. The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class

action may be maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common to the class predominate over the questions affecting individual
members. It is only where this predominance exists that economies can
be achieved by means of the class-action device.... Id. at 103.
9. Subdivision (c)(2) -

10. Subdivisions (c)(2), (c)(3). "Option out" is unavailable in the other types

of class action. See Housing Authority v. United States Housing Authority, 15 Fed.
Rules Serv. 2d 1239 (D. Neb. 1972) (denying requests for exclusion in a 23 (b) (2)
case); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); 3B J. MooPR,
23.55 (2d ed. 1969).
FEDERAL PRAcrc
11. See Advisory Note, supra note 7, at 107:

This mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2), together with any
discretionary notice which the court may find it advisable to give under

subdivision (d) (2), is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to
which the class action procedure is of course subject....
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rules have proven to be uncomfortable in application, and courts have
been tempted to fudge a bit to achieve satisfactory results. Indeed, the
experience of the federal courts has been sufficiently uneasy that some
consideration is being given, in the context of a comprehensive reevaluation
12
of federal rule 23, to various proposals for further revision of the rule.
Since most of the problems plaguing the federal courts will also present
themselves to state courts administering an identical rule, a review and
analysis of the federal experience seems appropriate. This article offers
such a review and analysis. It begins with a description of some typical
cases likely to occur in the state courts under the new rule, aiming thereby
to identify the peculiar characteristics of the common-question class action,
if any, that justify special treatment as compared to other types. After considering in detail the handling of the notice requirement of federal rule

23 (c)(2) in the federal courts and the probable effect of judgment in such
actions, the article will discuss some proposals for further reform of the
rule with a view toward their possible adoption in Missouri. In particular,
it will be argued that the "option out" provision is constitutionally
unnecessary and therefore undesirable because it makes more burdensome
notice constitutionally necessary.
II.

CHARACrERISTICS OF THE COMMON-QUESTION CATEGORY

A. Some Typical Cases
In the federal courts, the availability of the common-question class
action has been drastically limited by the decision in Snyder v. Harris,13
in which the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional amount requirements of sections 1331 and 1332 of the Judicial Code14-the general federal
question and diversity-of-citizenship provisions-cannot be met by cumulating the several claims of the members of a common-question class.15 As
a practical matter, therefore, the claims of or against a common-question

class must arise under special federal laws with respect to which the federal
courts have jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy. By
far the most fruitful such provisions have been section 4 of the Clayton
Act,' 6 which provides for private treble damage claims for violation of
12. Letter from Hon. A. Sherman Christensen, Senior District Judge and
member of the Advisory Committee, to the author, February 28, 1973. Judge
Christensen is also a member of a special subcommittee of the Committee on
Court Administration of the Judicial Conference of the United States, which
recently conducted a study of fiscal and administrative problems of the court
in giving notice under rule 23 (c) (2). The present author, among many others,
was asked for his views; that request, along with Judge Christensen's admirable Report and Recommendations distilling the results of his inquiry, provided a major
stimulus to the preparation of this article.
13. 894 U.S. 332 (1969).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1968).
15. See note 42 infra.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Jurisdiction is expressly provided for without regard to the amount in controversy.
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the antitrust laws, and various provisions of the securities laws 17 that create
(expressly or by judicial implication) private damages claims for certain
violations of those laws.' s The public policy underpinnings of those statutes' 9 may contribute significantly to the usually liberal interpretation
of the class action rule by the federal courts, and may suggest a reason
for somewhat less expansive treatment in the state courts.
In the state courts, of course, the jurisdictional amount problem is
not presented at the trial level. Therefore, the range of fact situations
in which class action treatment may be proper should be greater. Snyder
v. Harrisitself, for example, came out of Missouri at a time when the class
action device probably would not have been available, 20 but it would
be a good candidate under the new rule. 21 In Snyder, a stockholder in a
Missouri life insurance company sued members of the board to recover,
for distribution to herself and all other stockholders ratably, amounts received by the directors from sale of their shares in excess of fair value,
apparently as a premium for control. Four thousand stockholders were
represented, with claims totalling about $1.2 million; Mrs. Snyder's own
claim was worth $8,740. In the companion case decided in the same
opinion, Gas Service Co. v. Coburn,22 a gas customer sued to recover city
franchise taxes collected by the company; he sued on behalf of himself and
all other customers who paid the tax but who, like himself, lived outside
the city limits and were therefore not subject to the tax.
A less likely candidate for class action treatment that is, nonetheless,
sometimes nominated is the so-called mass accident situation, in which
a large number of persons are injured in a single catastrophic event. If
this is a class action situation, the action would be of the common-question
type.2 3 Attempts at class action treatment for such cases in the courts
have been rare, but not always unsuccessful.2 4 The federal advisory com17. See Securities Act of 1938 §§ 11, 12, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1970); Securities Act of 1988 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1984
§ 9 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i (e) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10 (b), 15
U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970) in conjunction with SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1971); Securities Exchange Act of 1984, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). Federal court
jurisdiction over cases arising under these provisions is governed by the Securities
Act of 1983 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1984
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970); neither sets forth a jurisdictional amount.
18. See the discussion of these cases in 7A C. W IGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1781, at 79 (1972).
19. See text accompanying note 178 infra.
20. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
21. According to the Supreme Court's opinion in Snyder, by the time the appeals had reached that court another action had already been instituted in Missouri state courts. 894 U.S. at 841. It has not surfaced in the reports.
22. 894 U.S. 882 (1969).
28. If, however, an insurance policy was involved, the first opinion in
Barnard v. Murphy, 865 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1963), might afford precedent for classifying the action as a "hybrid," now covered by Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08 (b) (1) (B).
24. See generally Comment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. Rlv.

1615 (1972).
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mittee 25 and at least one commentator 26 have assumed that the mass
accident case would normally involve too many individual questions and
would therefore be inappropriate for class action treatment; other com27
mentators have disagreed.
Consumer cases are certain to be pressed on the state courts as almost
textbook examples of what some regard as the peculiar mission of the
class action: the assertion of many claims, large in overall impact but each
too small to be sued on individually. 28 Barnard v. Murphy,29 a 1964 case
that the Missouri Supreme Court found to be an improper class action,
might well fare better under the new rule. Three lessees of lockers in a food
locker plant sued the plant for themselves and about 260 others, claiming
damages for spoilage due to inadequate cooling. The action was held improper because there was no common fund involved, the plant's insurance
policy having been removed from the case.3 0 The common fund requirement is presumably abolished by the new rule, although there might be
substantial individual questions of causation as well as damages, so that
the "predominance" test might not be met (in the actual case liability to
31
all class members was admitted).
Even consumer fraud may be the subject of a class action for damages
under a sympathetic reading of the federal rule. In Vasquez v. Superior
Court3 2 the California Supreme Court, drawing on the federal model in
interpreting a rather vague code provision traditionally given much narrower scope,38 found a class action proper. Purchasers of food freezers and
25. Advisory Note, supra note 7, at 103.
26. See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
BuFM..o L. REv. 433, 469 (1960).
27. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE 23.43, at 811 n. 35 (2d ed. 1969);

7A C. WRIGrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAImCE AND PROCEDURE, § 1783 (1972); Com-

ment, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1615, 1615-16 (1972).
28. See Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit,
8 U. CH. L. REv. 684 (1941); Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L.
R1v. 21 (1970).
29. 378 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1964).
30. See Martin, Procedure-The Common Fund Problem in Missouri Class
Actions, 29 Mo. L. REv. 77 (1964), criticizing the first decision in the case, Barnard
v. Murphy, 365 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1963), which had held that the insurance policy,
required by state law, constituted a common fund (at that time the insurer was
a party).

31. It is well-settled that mere variation in the amount of damages among
the members of the class does not preclude a finding of "predominance" of common questions. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PA ,arm 23.45[2] nn. 29 &30 (2d ed.
1969); 7A C. WRrGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcriCE AND PROCEDURE § 1788, at
54-55 (1972).
32. 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1971).
33. CALr. CxV. PRO. CODE § 382 (1954):

[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit
of all.
As recently as 1948 the California Supreme Court had interpreted this provision
as in effect precluding common-question class actions where the causes of action
HeinOnline -- 38 Mo. L. Rev. 179 1973
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supplies under installment sales contracts sued the seller and the finance
companies to which the contracts were assigned; plaintiffs demanded rescission and damages on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations as to
quality, warranty, and price. The defendants insisted that the nature of
the misrepresentations and the element of reliance would vary from plaintiff to plaintiff, so that class action treatment would be inappropriate. The
complaint alleged, however, that the misrepresentations followed a consistent pattern with respect to the class of 200-odd purchasers in the area, and
the court held on demurrer that this satisfied the common question requirement. The element of reliance was supplied in turn by a presumption
34
from the circumstances, subject to rebuttal by the defendants.
A case recently decided by an Illinois appellate court will serve to
illustrate some of the more complex problems of class actions in state
courts. In Reardon v. Ford Motor Co.85 the plaintiff, a purchaser of an
allegedly defective automobile, sued the manufacturer on behalf of himself and all other purchasers of cars of the same make in certain model years
in the entire country. The class was allegedly 4,000,000 persons strong;
the relief sought was compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a
"mandatory injunction" requiring recall and replacement of an allegedly
defective part. The Illinois court was able to rid itself of the class action
aspect under its common law precedents, which precluded the device where
the claims of the class were technically separate and independent.
Under the new Missouri rule a different analysis would be required,
and the result would not be so easy to reach. Proper analysis under the
Missouri rule would involve at least the following questions:
(I) To what extent are the claims of different class members governed by different state laws? Liability to be determined according to
different laws can hardly be said to be a "common question." Can the
class be divided into subclasses according to the state laws that will govern?
Rule 52.08 (c) (4) authorizes such subdividing "when appropriate."
(2) Given common questions, to which category does the case belong?
were technically separate and substantial individual questions would arise. See
Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses, 32 Cal. 2d 833, 198 P.2d 514 (1948). In
1970, the state legislature adopted a Consumer Legal Remedies Act, CALIF. CIV.
CODE §§ 1740, 1781 (1970), which provides for class actions on essentially the
same terms as the federal common-question provision in cases involving certain
proscribed deceptive practices. The provision was inapplicable to Vasquez because
it was not in effect until after the litigation was begun. The supreme court had
already begun interpreting the old Field Code provision more liberally, however,
by the time Vasquez arose. See Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d
732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). An extensive historical review of class actions in California appears in Comment, Class Actions for Consumer Protection, 7 HARV. CIv.
RiGrrs-Crv. LID. L. Rav. 601, 607-18 (1972). See also Degnan, Forward: Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. Rrv. 705 (1972); Lobell,
Comments on Vasquez v. Superior Court, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 1042 (1971).
34. See also LaSala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d
1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
35. 7 Ill. App. 2d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (1972).
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Is the claim for "mandatory injunction" sufficient to bring the action
under 52.08 (b) (2), obviating the "superiority" and "predominance" criteria
6
as well as mandatory notice with option out?
(3) Given the applicability of the common-question category, is there
any satisfactory alternative to litigation as a class action, such as an
administrative proceeding resulting in a recall order? If not, probably the
''superiority" test is met.
(4) To what extent are damages claimed beyond the cost of replacing the defective part? Such claims may present issues individual to the
members.
(5) Does a state court have the power to entertain an action in which
claims are adjudicated that (a) arose elsewhere and (b) are held by persons having no contact with the forum? For example, if the defect is one
of design, which was created in Detroit, but the automobiles in question
were all assembled in Missouri, could a Missouri court adjudicate the
claim of a Florida citizen who bought his car in Florida? Would a notice
under rule 52.08 (c) (2), informing the Florida purchaser that he may
either drop out, appear by counsel, or remain passively in the class, suffice
to provide such jurisdiction? Note that rule 52.08 (b) (3) (C) requires
consideration of the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the
particular forum.
(6) If individual notice is to be sent to a 4,000,000-member class, at

a minimum cost of 320,000, who is to bear that cost? Can it be reduced
by using selective individual notice, or publication? Is there any publication that would be likely to reach a substantial number of purchasers of
cars of a given make across the nation? If full notice is impossible and
36. There is room for doubt, perhaps, that this claim for relief should properly be characterized as "injunctive" within the meaning of subdivision (b) (2), because it cannot be provided otherwise than by specific services rendered separately
to each individual member of the class, and then only if they request it. On the
other hand, it can be regarded as the functional 6quivalent of a declaration of the
right to replacement of a part without charge, combined undoubtedly with an
order to provide adequate notice of the right to the affected persons. It is more
analogous, however, to specific or "natural" compensation-repair of a damaged
thing by the wrongdoer rather than mere payment of the dollars-and-cents cost
of repair-a form of "damages" unknown to our law but constituting at least the
theoretical model for German damages law. See BGB § 249:
Whoever is obligated to provide compensation for injury is required to
restore the situation which would obtain, if the circumstance giving rise
to the obligation to compensate had not occurred. If compensation is to
be provided for injury to a person or damage to a thing, the person entitled thereto may demand, in place of restoration, the amount of money
required for such restoration.
(Author's translation)
See, e.g., I K. LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTs 185-86 (9th ed. 1969); 1 E.
COHN, MANUAL OF GERivAN LAW 105-56 (2d ed. 1968). In any event, the difficulty
in categorizing the relief so as to bring the action under Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08 (b) (2),
thus dispensing with the notice and "option-out" requirements under 52.08 (b) (3),
emphasizes the questionable nature' of the attempt to retain even pragmatically
defined categories in the rule. See part II, § B.
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lesser notice will not reach everyone, can the court nonetheless proceed
with lesser notice and let the parties take their chances?
B. Relationship to Other Categories

A comprehensive survey of the historical development of the class
action is available elsewhere.3 7 It should be enough to note here that both
the original formulation of federal rule 23 and the 1966 revision now
adopted in Missouri were attempts to describe the essential characteristics
of typical cases in which class action treatment is appropriate; the revision
constitutes a response to what numerous critics found to be the restrictive effects of the classification system of the original. 8 Since the 1966
revision also responded to the need to specify procedures for handling
class actions and to specify (to the extent possible) the consequences of
class action judgments, not only the availability but also the treatment of
class actions has now become tied to the system of categories.
Common to both formulations of federal rule 23, in any event, is a
parallel to the regulation of joinder of parties 9 on the one hand, and
to intervention 40 on the other, paying due respect to the twin gods of
Necessity and Convenience. Essentially similar criteria determine what
parties ought to be joined under federal rule 19 (a), what parties have
a right to intervene under federal rule 24 (a), and what parties constitute
a proper or "true" class under old federal rule 23 (a) (1) or new rule
23 (b) (I). This reflects the origin of the class action as a device for "avoiding the rigors of compulsory joinder": 4 ' when parties who ought to be
joined are so numerous that it is impracticable to do so, then let some
represent the interests of all, rather than dismiss for failure to join.
Similarly, the existence of common questions of law or fact supports,

as a matter of convenience, "permissive joinder" under federal rule 20,
"permissive intervention" under federal rule 24(b), and the commonquestion class action under old rule 23 (a) (3) or new rule 23 (b) (3).42

37. Most notably in Z. Cs*4uYEE, SoM PROBLEMS OF Equrry chs. V, VI, VII
(1950). See also Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLUM.
L. REV. 609, 609-29 (1971); Keeffe, Levy &cDonovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 38
CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948).
38. See Z. CHArE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY chs. V, VI, VII (1950); F.
Rosenfield, The Contemporary
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 500-01 (1965); Kalven &c
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684 (1941); Keeffe, Levy ScDonovan,
Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Simeone, Procedural Prob.
lems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REv. 905 953-59 (1962); Developments in the LawMultiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 929-33 (1958).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 20.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
41. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.18, at 497 (1965). See also 3B J.
23.08 (1) (2d ed. 1969).
FEDERAL PRACanCE,

MOORE,

42. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the Supreme Court's only pro.
nouncement to date on the categories of the new rule, emphasized this parallel
between permissive joinder, permissive intervention, and the common-question class
action, in holding that the individual claims of common-question class members
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The concept of necessity appears to support the first two categories of federal rule 23(b). What the federal advisory committee was
looking for, according to its reporter, Professor Benjamin Kaplan, was

the "natural class action", 43 which the committee envisioned as one in
which the final relief had to be unitary in order to protect the interests

of those deliberately or inevitably affected ((b)(1)), or in which the
final relief can be unitary because it extends only to common rights
(injunctive or declaratory relief, (b) (2)). It might be said, at a rather
high level of abstraction, that categories (b) (1) and (b) (2), in revised
form, concern themselves with claims for relief having an intended or
incidental prospective effect: The effect of multiple adjudication on the
opponent's conduct, under (b) (1) (A); the ability of absent members to
vindicate their rights after adjudication of the representatives' claims or
defenses, under (b) (1) (B); the injunctive order against the opponent to
do or refrain from doing something, or the declaration (for future reference) of rights and duties, under (b) (2). As to categories (b) (1) and
(b) (2), the contribution of the revision consists in shifting from a description of the "jural relations" among the members of the class to a description of the impact of judgment in individual actions on the interests of
those affected. 44
Subdivision (b) (3) is then left as a catchall for the situations in

which totally or partially unitary adjudication is not thought to be necessary or natural, but convenient. It is generally supposed that an action
for damages only is not a "natural" for class-action treatment in this
sense, because multiple judgments can be enforced in isolation from one
another.4 5 Accordingly, the courts have held that stare decisis in and

cannot be cumulated for jurisdictional amount purposes. The Court pointed out
that the rule against aggregation of distinct claims was first enunciated in a joinderof-claims case:
When two or more plaintiffs having separate and distinct demands, unite
for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount ....
Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). The principle applies
equally, said the Court, to the common-question class action, even as now struc-

tured. The argument that because the judgment now binds absent members even
in common-question cases, the claims should no longer be considered separate, was
refuted by simply pointing out that in permissive joinder cases the judgment also
binds all those joined. To the court's argument one might add that since absent
members of common-question classes are not bound if they utilize the "option-out"

feature, a distinction cannot be made between voluntary joinder for convenience
under FED. R. Civ. P. 20 and involuntary joinder for convenience under FED. R.
Civ. P. 23 (b)(3).
43. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure(I), 81 HAsv. L. REv. 356, 387 (1967).
44. See, e.g., C. WuGrr, FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 307 (2d ed. 1970).
45. See Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., 57 F.R.D. 189, 192-93 (C.D.
Calif. 1972); Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KA.. L. REv. 811,
823-24 (1970); Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. &
Corm. L. R.v. 539, 540 (1969).
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of itself does not satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b) (1) (B).40
To hold otherwise, of course, would leave the common-question category
empty, except for questions of fact. On the other hand, to the extent that
a depletable common fund may be involved, so that satisfaction of individual claims in isolation might jeopardize satisfaction of others in a
more concrete fashion, subdivision (b) (1) (B) has been applied to the

exclusion of subdivision (c)(2)-type notice.41
Occasionally, however, the fact that subparagraph (b) (1) requires not
only the possibility of multiple adjudications,

48

but also either incom-

patible standards for the opponent or impairment of protection for the
absent member, seems to escape the courts. The most troublesome cases
have involved defendant classes, for the peculiar characteristics of which
the rule unfortunately makes no allowance. In Guy v. Abdulla49 a trustee
in bankruptcy sued to recover certain voidable preferences and fraudulent
conveyances from a class of creditors alleged to have conspired to obtain
such preferences. The district court held that subparagraph (b) (1) applied, though only with respect to specified common issues, thus precluding "option out" by the absent members of the defendant class.
The court stated two grounds for the decision: (1) Separate actions could
produce recovery against some defendants and not others, an "anomalous"
result that rule 23 was intended to avoid; and (2) the possible stare
decisis effect of one adjudication would, within the meaning of (b) (1) (B),
be practically dispositive of the other claims. The unmistakable concern
of the court was to avoid the application of subdivision (c) (2), which
allows "option out": "Obviously, a defendant class whose members could
remove themselves would not be very meaningful."s 0 Similar considerations
46. Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Calif. 1972).
47. See Walker v. City of Houston, 841 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D. Tex. 1971), in
which ex-members of firemen's and policemen's pension systems sought to establish
the right to withdraw their employees' contributions to the funds after termination
of their employment. See also Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D.
338,387 (D.R.I. 1969), involving claims to a specified share of track receipts as
a purse fund.
It is often stated as a general principle that if a class falls into subdivision (b)
(1)or (b) (2), it should be treated as a (b) (1) or (b) (2) class, even though the criteria of subdivision (b) (3)are also met (as they usually would be). Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 259 F. Supp. 125 (S.D.N.Y.1966) (leading case); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry.,
318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970), affd without opinion,441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir.
1971); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass n, 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.I. 1969); 3B J.
MooRr, FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.31[31 (2d ed. 1969); 7A C. WIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1772, at 7 (1972).
48. It was held in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 891 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir.
1968), that where individual claims were so small as to make individual actions
economically impracticable, there was no risk of multiple litigation and (b) (1) was
inapplicable.
49. 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
50. Id. at 17. One quite plausible, though unstated, reason for the result would
be the strong federal policy embodied in the bankruptcy laws, a factor also present
in the patent cases. But the stated reasoning is nonetheless faulty and misleading.
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may be behind decisions that apply subdivision (b) (1) to actions against defendant classes of alleged patent infringers.Si On the other hand in Dudley
v. Southeastern Factor & Finance Gorp.5 2 the court found that an action

against a defendant class of shareholders for restitution of shares received in
a corporate purchase of another company's stock, allegedly in violation of
plaintiffs' rights as preferred shareholders in the merged corporation, was
properly a common-question case calling for (c) (2)-type notice.
Where the action involves claims for a mixture of injunctive or
declaratory relief and damages, such as a Civil Rights Act claim based
on employment discrimination where both back pay and an injunction

against further discrimination are demanded, the courts have preferred
non- (b) (3) treatment5 3 and have excluded

(c) (2)-type notice.5 4 On the

51. Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 801 F. Supp. 497
(N.D. IlL. 1969); Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc.,
285 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968). In Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics,
Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D.N.H. 1971), two grounds weremade explicit: (1) Injunctive relief (though apparently not demanded in the complaint) would be a natural
and necessary remedy to prevent future infringements; and (2) the practical impact of a decision on the validity of a patent on the conduct of other licensees, and
of varying decisions on the position of the plaintiff, satisfies subdivision (b) (1).
The second ground is highly doubtful, because neither branch of subdivision
(b) (1) literally covers the situation. Subdivision (b) (I) (A) requires a risk of
establishing "incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class";
subdivision (b) (1) (B) requires a risk of disposition of the interests of absent members, or of substantial impairment of their ability to protect their interests. A claim
seeking class-action relief againsta class in favor of a single plaintiff, however, fails
on both counts: Impairment of the plaintiff's ability to protect his interests does
not matter; and separate actions resulting in some adjudications of validity and
some of invalidity may destroy the value of the patent but impose no standards
of conduct whatsoever on the plaintiff. See In re Yarn Processing Patent Litigation,
16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 835, 839 (S.D. Fla. 1972).

The application of subdivision (b) (2) to claims for injunctive relief against
a class in favor of a single plaintiff is equally open to question. Indeed, the patent

cases appear to rely in part on the probability that the defendant class will
want injunctive relief against the plaintiff in the event of a finding of invalidity,
even if they have not asked for it. See, e.g., Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated
Growers, Inc., supra at 500: "The defendants would certainly require that the
plaintiff not sue them further, if the patent were held invalid . .. ." In any case,
the commentators are in agreement that subdivision (b) (2) was intended to cover
only injunctive relief in favor of the class. See, e.g., 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL P crMiC
§ 23.40 n.17 (Supp. 1972); 7A C. WRIGHT &cA. MILLER, FE DEAL PRACCE AND PROCEDURE § 1775, at 21-22 (1972); Note, Class Actions in Patent Suits: An Improper
Method of Litigating Patents?, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 474, 489-90 (1971). All of the illustrations in the Advisory Note, supra note 7, at 102, involve claimant classes. The
reason for the distinction is nowhere explained and is unclear; it may have to do
with the notion that injunctive relief against a class is to be regarded as personal to
each individual member, comparable to the claim for damages for or against a
class.
52. 57 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
53. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref.
Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972); Boles v. Union Camp Corp. 57 F.R.D.
46 (S.D. Ga. 1972). See also Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 56 F.R.D. 435
(W.D. Pa. 1972), applying FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2) to an action to enjoin enHeinOnline -- 38 Mo. L. Rev. 185 1973
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other hand, where courts have found that claims for prospective relief
are secondary and the predominant claim is for damages, subdivision
(b) (3) has been held applicable. 515 Here again, however, confusion has
cropped up. In Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment,1 6 an action
by Negro purchasers of homes on installment land contracts against lenders
and sellers who allegedly conspired to exploit the housing segregation
problem by fixing unconscionable prices and conditions, the court found
both (b) (2) and (b) (3) applicable, and determined that the final relief
sought did not relate "predominantly to money damages," but ordered
(c) (2)-type notice anyway.5 7 And in Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co.,6s
an employment discrimination case in which plaintiffs claimed both injunctive and monetary relief on behalf of a class including future female
employees at the defendant's plant, the court found both subdivisions

(b) (2) and (b) (3) applicable, yet ordered (c) (2)-type notice with "option
out" with respect to all but future employees.
The courts have disagreed in such mixed-relief cases on the extent
to which they should be treated as part (b) (2), part (b) (3) cases. Some
courts have expressly reserved the back pay portion for distinct treatment
at a later stage,5 9 while others have assumed that if subdivision (b) (2)
applies at all, the option-out and appearance privileges are excluded as
to the entire case.0 0 If the distinction is to be made at all, it would seem
that this should depend on the separability of the issues raised by the
different claims for relief: the more issues in common, the less meaningful
the special privileges for the damages claim, and the less likely that
(c) (2)-type notice will serve a useful purpose.
It can scarcely be denied that the new system of categories, with its
emphasis on the practical consequences of individual action and on the
judicial economy of class action treatment, has greatly eased the task
forcement of a rule classifying married female students as nonresidents solely
because their husbands were so classified and to recover the amount of excess fees
exacted as a result of that rule.
54. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Baxter
v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 350 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
55. E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle ScJacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968); Goldman v. First Natl Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Free World Foreign Cars,
Inc. v. Alfa Romeo, S.p.A., 55 F.R.D. 26, 30 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Baham v.
Southern Bell Tel. &cTel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972), it was held that
mootness of the claim for injunctive relief precluded class-action treatment of the
back pay claim under subdivision (b) (2).
56. 48 F.R.D. 7 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
57. Id. at 13-14 n.2. See also Mack v. General Elec. Co., 15 Fed. Rules Serv.
2d 113, 799 (E.D. Pa. 1971), a civil rights action in which both injunctive relief
and damages were demanded but subdivision (c)(2)-type notice with option out
was ordered.
58. 54 F.R.D. 465 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
59. E.g., Boles v. Union Camp Corp., 57 F.R.D. 46 (S.D. Ga. 1972). See also 3B
J. Mooma, FnDzsuLx PRAcncE 23.45, at 708 (2d ed. 1969).
60. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971); Jacobi v.
Bache & Co., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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of determining whether or not a class action of some sort is proper. The
job of determining which category applies, however, seems as difficult
as ever. When an action for damages can be brought under subdivision
(b) (1) because of stare decisis, in order to prevent "option out"; when
an order to recall and replace might be brought under subdivision (b) (2)
while an action for the cost of replacement would be subsumed under
(b) (3); and when a court faced with a claim for both prospective and
monetary relief must decide, unaided, whether to treat the case as all
(b) (2), all (b) (3), or partly each, merely because the procedural prerequisites and consequences are different, the system is functioning improperly.
The fact of the matter seems to be that the categories are not so
distinguishable from one another as to justify the difference in treatment.
Not even the distinction between "natural" and merely "convenient"
class actions-the justification offered by the Advisory Committee for the
difference in treatment-will serve. For example, the case of a large number of small damage claimants who could not afford to sue separately,

but who could afford to sue together, is just as much a "naturar' for
class action treatment as the common fund situation. Nonetheless it is
clear that the former belongs to subdivision (b) (3), while the latter belongs
to subdivision (b) (1) (B). To be sure, the alternative for the small claimants is not separate litigation, which in the common fund situation would
result in an inequitable distribution of limited compensation; the alternative is no litigation at all, which would result in the equally undesirable
frustration of legitimate claims. If categories can be formulated so as to
include only "natural" class actions on the one hand, or "convenient"
class actions on the other, it is submitted that this has not yet been done.
III. NoTicE
A. The Requirements of Due Process: Notice, Adequate
Representation, or Both?
The difficulties of applying the categories, aggravated by a judicial
coolness toward the concept of "opting out," have helped also to confuse
the debate over whether the concepts of due process, enunciated principally
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 61 require some form
of notice to be directed to the absent members of the class in all class
actions, in order for the court to have the power to render a decision
binding on the class. While the cases seem to be numerically split on the
larger question, 62 it is frequently unclear whether the courts refusing
61. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
62. Notice required in all class actions: Eisen v. Carlisle &cJacquelin, 391 F.2d
555, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1968), is the leading case, although it was dictum, because
subdivision (b) (3) was held applicable; Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd.
No. 76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972); Zeilstra v. Tarr,
466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972); Arey v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C.
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to order notice were refusing it generally, or refusing only the specific
form and content of notice prescribed in subdivision (c) (2). It is often
equally unclear whether the courts insisting on the requirement of notice
were insisting on the full Mullane treatment as to each class member, or
only complaining of a lack of some sort of notice.
For purposes of this article, we are ultimately concerned with the
question of whether the literal language of subdivision (c) (2)-"individual
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort"is to be regarded as expressing a constitutionalstandard for (i) the maintenance of a (b) (3) class action at all, or at least for (ii) res judicata
effect of the judgment vis--vis identifiable but unnotified members of
the class.6 3 We begin, however, with the broader question: does due
process require Mullane-type notice for all class actions? In the next two
sections of part III, B and C, we will deal with the special characteristics
of the common-question category.
The steadfast position of the federal advisory committee since 1938
has been to avoid foreclosing the question of due process in the text of
the rule itself, on the ground that the only true test of due process comes
on collateral attack in a separate proceeding.64 The old rule required
notice in the case of dismissal or settlement of "true" class actions, 65
but made no further mention of the subject. The new rule extends the
requirement of notice in these two situations to all types of class actions,66
and makes pretrial notice of a special sort mandatory also in the case of

common-question classes, while expressly providing for discretionary no1972); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis. 1970),
aff'd on alternative grounds, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1971); Pasquier v. Tarr, 318
F. Supp. 1350, 1353-54 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd on alternative ground, 444 F.2d 116
(5th Cir. 1971); Fowles v. American Export Lines, 300 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Snyder v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 286 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
Notice not required in non-(b)(3) class actions: Northern National Gas Co. v.
Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619 (D. Kan. 1968), is the leading case, although the court
did order prejudgment notice; Hammond v. Powell, 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 214
(4th Cir. 1972); Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 871
(S.D. Ga. 1972); Woodward v. Rogers, 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 241 (D.D.C. 1972);
Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md. 1972); McGriff v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
51 F.R.D. 479 (D.S.C. 1971); Mungin v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720
(M.D. Fla. 1970), affd mem. 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971); Gregory v. Hershey, 51
F.R.D. 188 (E.D. Mich. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Gregory v. Tarr,
436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1971); Johnson v. City of Baton Rouge, 50 F.R.D. 295
(E.D. La. 1970).
63. This section of the article discusses part (i) of the question; for a discussion of the res judicata aspect, see pt. IV below.
64. 3B J. MooRE, FEDEA.L PRAcrIE
23.111l] (2d ed. 1969); cf. Moore's
own recommendation in Moore, FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems
Raised by the PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 571 (1937).
65. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (c) (1938).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (e) (1966). It has been held that "dismissal" means only
voluntary dismissal. Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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tice in subdivision (d) (2). Although subdivision (c) (3) defines the scope
that the judgment in a class action should purport to have, the Committee explicitly disclaimed any power to determine in advance what the
67
ultimate res judicata effect of the judgment should be.
The argument that due process requires notice of the pendency of
the action to the absent members of the class rests on the opinion in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,68 in which the issue was
the validity of a provision for notice by publication in the New York
common trust fund statute. The statute allowed banks to establish common trust funds in which they could pool the assets of individual trusts
of which they were trustees, but required a periodic judicial accounting
at which beneficiaries of participating trusts could assert claims of mismanagement or other breach of fiduciary duty. The judicial settlement
would bind all beneficiaries with respect to such claims. All beneficiaries
not appearing were represented by a guardian ad litem-not himself a
beneficiary-appointed by the court; the only attempt to notify any beneficiaries was four weekly advertisements in a local newspaper. The
Supreme Court held, on a direct challenge to the local court's jurisdiction, that the notice was insufficient and that the judgment of settlement
was inconsistent with due process. In stating the general principle, the
Court delivered itself of the following ringing language:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections.0 9
The Court then proceeded to outline two broad categories of trust
beneficiaries, with respect to whom the notice requirements is different:
(1) Beneficiaries whose interests are conjectural or future or whose whereabouts are unknown may be notified by publication, because there is
no better way; (2) beneficiaries who have present interests, and whose
recent whereabouts are known, must be given a more direct notice. Clearly,
this is the standard incorporated into subdivision (c) (2) of the class
action rule, which requires "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort."
To be sure, Mullane itself was not a class action. Nevertheless, to
the extent that the rights and duties of a class member are to be finally
adjudicated without his consent or participation, and he is represented
by persons not of his own choosing, the principle stated thus broadly

67. PRoP. FE . R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 106
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note].
68. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
69. Id. at 314.
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must apply. This argument has been accepted by a number of courts,
most notably the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits,70 and by several
7
commentators. '

The argument against a due process requirement of notice in class
actions is somewhat more complex, but it is based on the proposition
that in representative actions it is adequate representation, not notice,
that satisfies due process. 72 Typically the argument traces back to Hansberry v. Lee,73 in which the Supreme Court held that plaintiff landowners
seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant against another landowner about
to violate it, where the enforceability of the covenant was at issue, could
not constitutionally represent a class of landowners some of whom were
interested in invalidating the covenant. In that case it was emphasized
that the representative action was a recognized exception to the general
rule that a judgment could not bind persons not formally joined as
parties; the use of notice to absent parties as a means of satisfying due

70. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972); Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (6th
Cir. 1972) (alternative ground); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564-65
(2d Cir. 1968) (dictum).
71. See Ward &cElliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10
B.C. In. &cConr. L. Ry., 557, 560 (1969); Comment, Can Due Process be Satisfied
by DiscretionaryNotice in Federal Class Actions?, 4 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 268, 30002 (1971); Comment, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MiNN. L. Rv. 509,
521-24 (1967). This view was represented before Mullane, See Keeffe, Levy Sc
Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 338-39 (1948), interpreting
Hansberiy v. Lee itself (see text accompanying notes 72-78 infra) as turning on
the lack of notice; Comment, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule
23,46 COLUJm. L. REv. 818, 833-36 (1946); cf. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81
HAtv. L. Ray. 356, 396 (1967). See also Simeone, Procedural Problems of Class
Suits, 60 MIcH. L. R.mv. 905, 954-59 (1962).
72. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 292 F. Supp. 619, 636 (D. Kan.
1968); see cases cited note 62 supra, which hold notice is not required in non- (b) (3)
class actions. A numerical majority of the commentators agree that it is adequate
representation, not notice, that satisfies due process. See 3B J. MooR, FEDERAL
PR.AcrIcE 23.55, at 1152-53 (2d ed. 1969); 7A C. WRIGrr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
Sutton, Welfare Class
PR.ACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 142-44 (1972); Subrin &c
Actions in FederalCourt:A ProceduralAnalysis, 8 HARy. Civ. RiGirrs-Civ. LIn. L.
Rav. 21, 69-73 (1973); Degnan, Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60
CAiar. L. Rav. 705, 718-19 (1972); Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal
Rule, 71 COLUM. L. Rr v. 609, 645.46 (1971); Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Actions,
50 ORE. L. Rav. 21, 37-38 (1970); Maraist Sc Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled
Marriage:Due Processand the Class Action, 49 TExAs L. REv. 1, 9-10 n.37 (1970);
Travers & Landers, Consumer Class Actions, 18 KAN. L. RV. 811, 827 (1970);

Comment, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement,
29 MD. L. Rav. 139, 145-57 (1969) ; Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and
the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 889, 914 (1968); Note, ProposedRule 23: Class Actions Reclassi.
fied, 51 VA. L. Ray. 629, 638 (1965).
73. 811 U.S. 32 (1940).
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process was not mentioned. 74 The Hansbery opinion also contains broad
language tending to support adequate representation as a self-sufficient
criterion:
It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a
class not present as parties to the litigation may be bound by
the judgment where they are in fact adequately represented by
parties who are present, or where they actually participate in
the conduct of the litigation in which members of the class are
present as parties, . . . or where the interests of the members
of the class, some of whom are present as parties, is joint, or
where for any other reason the relationship between the parties
present and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle
the former to stand in judgment for the latter....7S
Mullane, it is pointed out, was not a class action, because the "representa-

tive" was not a member of the class or classes of beneficiaries of the
trusts. There were thus no "interested parties" originally joined. Rather,
the opinion set up a model for service of process-the acquisition of personal jurisdiction over defendants-whereas it is of the essence of the
class action that jurisdiction need not be acquired over all members of
the class. 70 To apply Mullane to all class actions would be to destroy the
usefulness of the device.7 7 Therefore Mullane cannot be regarded as
restricting the broader view intimated in the Hansberry opinion:
Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to say
that, when the only circumstance defining the class is that the
determination of the rights of its members turns upon a single
issue of fact or law, a state could not constitutionally adopt a
procedure whereby some of the members of the class could stand
in judgment for all, provided that the procedure were so devised
and applied as to ensure that those present are of the same class
as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to
78
insure the full and fair consideration of the common issue....
The best that can be said of the Supreme Court cases on the constitutional question is that they present a mixed picture, ripe for speculation. 79 Actually, the issue seldom arises in pure form, i.e. under a plea of
74. In one leading case that held a class action proper, Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 288 (1853), and in another that held a class action judgment
binding on collateral attack, Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 856
(1921), notice was likewise neither given nor discussed.
75. 311 U.S. at 42-43.
76. See Homburger, supra note 72, at 645.
77. Maraist &cSharp, supra note 72, at 15.
78. 311 U.S. at 43.
79. Certainly the most ambitious attempt to distill working rules out of the
cases on notice is that of Professors Maraist &cSharp, supra note 72. They formulate the rule that a class member can be bound by a judgment only if:
(1) Actual notice, either by personal service or by mail, is given to the
party; or
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res judicata in a subsequent proceeding. Since the adoption of the 1966
revision of the federal rule, there are few reported lower-court cases. 8 0
One involved a collateral challenge to the sufficiency of 25 (c) (2) notice,
in which the court held that actual participation in the proceedings
through an attorney of their choice precluded plaintiffs from challenging
a settlement.8 '
A second case, Research Corp. v. EdwardJ. Funk & Sons Corp.,8 2 was an
action to enforce a judgment that the plaintiff had obtained against a
defendant class of patent infringers; the defendant in the enforcement
action resisted on the grounds that it had not been served with process
(2) No actual notice is given, but
(a) the state has a direct and compelling interest that may be vindicated in the proceeding, or
(b) the interests of the absent parties are adequately represented in
the proceeding, and
(i) the absent party has consented to the representation, or
(ii) the state has an indirect but important interest that will be
served by the proceeding and that will be defeated if the proceeding cannot be maintained without actual notice to the
absent parties.
Id. at 19. A "direct and compelling interest" is one held by the sovereign itself or
its subdivisions, and includes improving public lands and works, compelling a
father to support his child, distributing abandoned property, and collecting
taxes. Id. at 3. "Consent" by an absent party includes formation of a corporation,
purchasing corporate stock, joining an unincorporated association, or employing
an attorney to represent him in litigation. Id. at 4. "Indirect but important interest of the state" includes that of finality in the administration of estates, for example. Id. at 5. The state's interest in enforcement of important regulatory schemes
such as the antitrust and securities laws also probably qualifies, but the judicial
economy, as such, that is achieved by a class action "that seeks merely to combine
large numbers of similar but basically separate claims" probably does not qualify.
Id. at 21 &22.
Probably the last assertion is the most difficult to support on the basis of the
cases up to Mullane, since none of them dealing with notice involved class actions,
and none of the class action cases involved notice. It is supported, however, by the
decision in Snyder v. Harris,which emphasized the lack of that special federal
concern with diversity-of-citizenship cases that would justify changing the restrictive rules governing jurisdictional amount. Most of these cases, said the Court,
should be tried in state courts. In the context of this article the remaining question would be, of course, whether state courts should be more concerned with
judicial economy, because they must try the cases anyway; the federal courts, by
denying class action treatment, rid themselves of the case altogether.
Especially important to note, however, for purposes of this article, is that
Maraist and Sharp view the matter as one of balancing the interests of the state
with those of the members of the class; they believe that between actual notice to
all members and no notice to any of them lies a spectrum of intermediate measures, such as selective individual notice and publication, and that the more notice given the less strong the public interest in unitary adjudication need be.
Maraist &Sharp, supra note 72, at 20-21.
80. Excluded are cases in which the right of appeal was denied to class members who had received notice of a settlement but failed to intervene or object or
otherwise appear at the trial level. See, e.g., Research Corp. v. Asgrow Seed Co.,
425 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
81. Connors v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 333 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
82. 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 580 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
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and it had not been adequately represented in the first action, but offered
no evidence to support the latter contention. The court held that formal
service of process was unnecessary in a class action, and that defendant
had not met its burden of proof on the defense of inadequate representation. The fact that no notice was given to absent members s was not
mentioned in the opinion.
Finally, a series of confusing and conflicting decisions has come down
collateral to a draft classification suit. Gregory v. Hersheys4 was an action
brought by registrants for a declaratory judgment that they were entitled
to a II-A classification (so-called fatherhood deferment). They had been
denied that classification under an exception for persons who had had
undergraduate II-S deferments after a certain date; they argued that the
exception was inapplicable, because their 1-S deferments had been graduate rather than undergraduate deferments. They sued the Selective Service System on behalf of themselves and all other persons in the country
similarly situated. The defendants sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground of the statutory prohibition against preinduction review.8 5 The district court held that the plaintiffs' interpretation of the
regulations was correct, and that there was no discretion in the local
board to deny the deferment, so that the preinduction review prohibition
was inapplicable.8 6 A declaratory judgment was granted to the effect

that the plaintiffs were entitled to the fatherhood deferment. No notice
was ordered or given, on the ground that none was required and it would

be impractical to attempt any in view of the number and difficulty of identifying the members of the class.
While this judgment was in effect, but on appeal, five United States
district courts decided cases in which members of the Gregory class sought
the benefit of the judgment, either to enjoin induction or to require
reclassification. Two of these decisions held that the judgment was binding;8 7 one held that while the lack of notice might have invalidated a
judgment unfavorable to the class, the doctrine of mutuality did not
require the defendants, who had had their day in court, to be relieved

83. See Research Corp. v. Pfister Associated Growers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 497
(N.D. Ill. 1969). See also Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), in which
res judicata effect of a prior class action judgment was denied on the ground of
inadequate representation, and in which the question of notice appears not to
have been raised.
84. 811 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd sub noma. Gregory v. Tarr, 436
F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
85. Selective Service Act of 1969 § 10 (b) (3), 50 U.S.C. § 460 (b) (3) (Supp.
1970).
86. The court relied on Oesterreich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 11,
393 U.S. 233 (1968).
87. Whitmore v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Neb. 1970), vacated & remanded,
443 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971); Germonprez v. Director

of Selective Serv., 318 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1970).
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of the burden of the judgment favorable to the class; 8 8 and two held that
the lack of notice precluded res judicata effect against the defendants,
on the principle of mutuality of estoppel.8 9 The latter two, of course,
also reached the opposite result on the jurisdictional issue and dismissed
the actions.
In January, 1971, Gregory was reversed by the Sixth Circuit on the
ground that the prohibition against preinduction review did in fact
apply9 0 At this point the argument of the Gregory class members in their
individual suits shifted to the proposition that acts of local boards in
violation of the Gregory judgment while it was still in effect were "lawless" and void. Two of the three district courts that had originally upheld
the res judicata plea reaffirmed their judgments on this new ground.0 1
The two decisions originally rejecting the res judicata plea for lack of
notice to the winning class members were affirmed on appeal by the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits respectively, but this time on the ground that the
Gregory judgment itself was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2
Two additional district courts, deciding for the first time, split on the
question; one accepted the "lawlessness" argument, 8 but the other rejected it on the jurisdictional ground. 04
Two United States courts of appeals then decided appeals from
decisions accepting the "lawlessness" argument, and both reversed. The
Sixth Circuit held that the Gregory judgment was without any binding
effect, both because it was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and because for lack of notice it was not a valid class action.0 5 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, having relied on the jurisdictional defect
a year before, 96 placed its decision in Schrader v. Selective Service System
Local Board #7697 squarely on the lack of notice in Gregory.
These decisions, along with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,9 8 from the
Second Circuit, make up the sum total of appellate decisions on the question of whether due process requires notice in all class actions. Eisen was
88. Schrader v. Selective Ser,. Sys. Local Bd. No. 76, 329 F. Supp. 966 (W.D.
Wis. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 78 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.Ct. 689 (1972).
89. McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis.
1970), affd, 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972); Pasquier v. Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350
(E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
90. Gregory v. Tarr, 436 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 922 (1971).
91. Whitmore v. Tarr, 331 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Neb. 1971); Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 76, 328 F. Supp. 891 (W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd, 470
F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972).
92. McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv. Sys., 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir.
1972); Pasquier v. Tan-, 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
93. Zeilstra v. Tar, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972) (trial court opinion not
published).
94. Sandler v. Tarr, 345 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1971), afrd, 463 F.2d 1096
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S.Ct. 321 (1972).
95. Zeilstra v. Tar, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
96. McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv., 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972).
97. 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972).
98. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
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dictum (although subsequently followed); the Sixth Circuit's ruling in
Zielstra was an alternative ground; and the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
Schrader, though unequivocal, was probably unnecessary.
It is dear that notice to members of the class, as a due process requirement, played no role in the Missouri law prior to adoption of the
new rule. Because the common-question class action in its "spurious"
form was not allowed, the question did not arise in that context. It was
equally absent, however, from the "true" and "hybrid" class actions that
were allowed. Rather, the emphasis was on the adequacy of representation,
as indicated by former rule 52.09 (a):
Whenever an action is instituted by one or more plaintiffs as
representative or representatives of a class or against one or more
defendants as representative or representatives of a class, the
petition shall allege such facts as shall show that they or the
defendants specifically named and served with process have been
fairly chosen and adequately and fairly represent the whole class.
The plaintiff shall be required to prove such allegations, unless
all of the members of the class have entered their appearance,
and it shall not be sufficient to prove such facts by the admission or admissions of the defendants who have entered their
appearance.
The emphasis not only on the fact of representativeness but also on
the manner of choice clearly implies involvement of the members of the
class (at least where the class is plantiff) in the selection of representatives-a pre-existing cohesion of the sort that has been presumed to be
present in the "true" class action.99 In such a situation, apparently, notice
to absent members in the context of the litigation would be considered
superfluous, because they (or a substantial portion of them) would have
been involved in the decision to sue in the first place. In the case of
defendant classes, which have been involved chiefly in annexation cases
under the Sawyer Act, 100 it is not the class members but the plaintiff
city that does the choosing, and the chief concern has been for obtaining
(1) a cross section of the types of existing land use in the area to be annexed, and (2) representation of those who have actively opposed annexation.101
99. See 7A C. Wuirr &A. MmLR, FEDERAL PRAcricE AND PROCEDURE § 1786,
at 143 (1972).
100. § 71.015, RSMo 1969.
101. City of Aurora v. Coleman, 490 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1978);
City of St. Charles v. Schroeder, 474 S.W.2d 55 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); City of
Montgomery v. Newson, 469 S.W.2d 54 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971); City of Salisbury v.
Nagel, 420 S.W.2d 37 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); City of Lebanon v. Holman, 402
S.W.2d 832 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); City of St. Ann v. Buschard, 356 S.W.2d 567
(St. L. Mo. App. 1962). See also Sheets v. Thomann, 336 S.W.2d 701 (St. L. Mo. App.
1960), an action to invalidate the renewal of subdivision restrictions under a trust indenture, in which both sides were classes, and in which only the defendant class
was discussed on appeal; a large group of persons in the defendant class had met
HeinOnline -- 38 Mo. L. Rev. 195 1973

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

In a few cases the absence of allegations as to the manner of choice
of representatives of a plaintiff class has been held to be fatal to the
class feature. In Milton Construction & Supply Co. v. Metropolitan St.
Louis Sewer District,02 for example, the developer of a subdivision sought
to recover deposits of $200 per lot made to the sewer district to secure
financing of sewer construction, after the developer constructed the sewers
at its own expense. Two sets of intervenors filed petitions purporting to
represent all lot owners, claiming that their purchase price included the
$200 and that therefore they, not the developer, were entitled to return
of the deposits. The petition of a husband and wife, who owned one
lot, did not allege anything about choice or adequacy of representation;
the petition of owners of 100 of the 297 lots alleged that they were adequate
representatives because they constituted a cross section, but did not allege
anything about the manner of choice. The St. Louis Court of Appeals
held that both petitions were insufficient and should not have been

granted as class claims. In Kansas City Terminal Railway v. Industrial

Commission'03 the court pointed out that rule 52.09 (a) was formulated
with a view toward satisfying due process requirements enunciated in

Hansberryv. Lee.' 0 4
It seems highly unlikely that the question will be resolved by the
Supreme Court in such dogmatic fashion as is suggested by the Mullaneor-nothing debate. It is surely more important to inquire into the purpose
of notice in the due process scheme. In the first instance, what is crucial
is the opportunity to be heard. In the case of the individual defendant,

notice and the opportunity to be heard go together because in the absence
of notice there is no opportunity to be heard; the defendant's position
will not be presented and the case will be decided on the basis of the

unilateral offerings of the plaintiff.105 In Mullane the same was true, insofar as a method of notice (publication) was utilized that was not reasonably
calculated to reach any significant number of beneficiaries, because none

of the persons whose interests were to be affected were formally joined
as parties; there was, in the procedure used, no assurance that the position of the beneficiaries would be forcefully asserted at all. The standard
of notice developed in the Mullane opinion, however, expressly accepts
the inevitability that not all beneficiaries can be effectively notified. The
requirement is not to reach all beneficiaries, but to reach enough of them
to ensure representation of what is a common interest in holding the
and had chosen the attorney of the named representatives to represent them. The
court held that to be a fair basis for choice.
102. 308 S.W.2d 769 (St. L. Mo. App. 1958).
103. 396 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. 1965).
104. See text accompanying notes 73-78 supra.
105. The leading cases applying a notice requirement to the two-party situation are: Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment replevin); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment); Schroeder v.
New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962) (condemnation); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112 (1956) (condemnation); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
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trustee to its fiduciary obligations; personal jurisdiction over each is
not required.
This type of trust presupposes a large number of small interests.
The individual interest does not stand alone but is identical with
that of a class. The rights of each in the integrity of the fund
and the fidelity of the trustee are shared by many other beneficiaries. Therefore notice reasonably certain to reach most of
those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the interests
of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit

of all.100
What is required by due process in class actions, therefore, is such
notice to the class as will ensure that the entire group will be adequately
represented. This is further emphasized by the fact that each member of
a class does not have a right to be heard as a full-fledged party, even if
he is notified. He has only the right to monitor the quality of representation, and to intervene formally if it is inadequate. 10 7 It should follow,
then, that if the representation of the class interests is adequate in the
members formally joined, the absence of notice as such should not be a
barrier to a judgment including the entire class. 108 Because the class
action may not be maintained at all unless the court finds that the
representation is adequate, according to rule 52.08 (a) (4), the proper role
of notice is to give the court added assurance that its finding is correct.
In all probability, the court should resolve doubts in favor of ordering
notice, so as to protect the integrity of the judgment against possible
collateral attack.
B. The Perquisitesof Rule 52.08(c)(2): Opting Out or Appearing
Whether a requirement of Mullane-type notice would apply to a
common-question class action, though not necessarily to other types, depends of course on the peculiar characteristics of the category. The rule
makes notice mandatory; but it goes further than that, and provides two
privileges to absent members not available in other types of class actions:
they may either remove themselves from the class altogether, or they may
enter an appearance through counsel. Clearly these privileges could not
be effectively exercised without early notice of the pendency of the
action. These perquisites, it would seem, make (c) (2) notice necessary

even if due process otherwise would not.10 9
106. 339 U.S. at 319.
107. See the intervention rule, Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.12 (a) and FED. R. CIV. P.
24(a). In practice, however, the federal courts have been liberal in allowing intervention by class members. See Advisory Note, supra note 67, at 110; 7A C.
WiuIT &A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAarICE AND PROCEDURE § 1799, at 254 (1972).
108. See, e.g., Homburger, supra note 72, at 609.
109. See Advisory Note, supra note 67, at 106-07, which states:
[Ulnder subdivision (c) (2), notice must be ordered, and is not merely
discretionary, to give the members in a subdivision (b) (3) class action an
opportunity to secure exclusion from the class.
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Why should absent members be allowed to opt out, or to file an
appearance? The advisory committee's Note contents itself with a passing
reference to "individual interest";"l 0 Professor Kaplan terms it "individual preference"."'1 The preliminary draft and notes add no clarification, although the original proposal would have allowed the court to
deny option out to any absent members whose presence was considered
essential to a fair adjudication. 1 2
The explanation appears to lie in the historical assumption that
technically separate claims cannot be joined in a class unless their holders
in some way agree to such a treatment. Since the judgment in the old
"spurious" class action was assumed to extend only to parties individually
joined," 38 and since in such cases many courts were moved-in order to
maximize the economies of class action treatment-to allow so-called
one-way intervention by absent members of the "spurious" class (that is,
intervention after judgment where the judgment is favorable to the
class, without being bound by an unfavorable judgment), 1 4 the advisory
committee sought out a compromise between permissive joinder and true
class-action treatment. As one commentator put it, the chosen model was
the Book-of-the-Month Club. 1 5 Obviously it was thought that mere
notice of the pendency of the action, analogous to (but not identical with)
service of process, would be insufficient to permit the court to render a
binding judgment; the presentation to the absent member of a prejudgment
take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum was thought to solve the problem. According
to one explanation increasingly adopted by the courts, the privileges were
thought to be necessary to overcome the inference of inadequate repre110. See id. at 104.05:
Subdivision (c)(2) makes special provision for class actions maintained

under subdivision (b) (3). As noted in the discussion of the latter subdivision, the interests of the individuals in pursuing their own litigations

may be so strong here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether.

Even when a class action is maintained under subdivision (b) (3), this individual interest is respected.
111. Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of
the FederalRules of Civil Procedure(I), 81 HAv. L. REv. 856, 391 (1967).
112. Id. at 391 n.136. The original proposal read as follows:

In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
exclude those members who, by a date to be specified, request exclusion,

unless the court finds that their inclusion is essential to the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy and states its reasons therefor. To
afford members of the class an opportunity to request exclusion, the court
shall direct that reasonable notice be given to the class, including specific
notice to each member known to be engaged in a separate suit on the
same subject matter with the party opposed to the class.

PRoP. Fm. R. Crv. P. 23 (c) (2), 34 F.R.D. 885, 386 (1964).
113. For the most comprehensive discussion see 3B J. MooRE,
icE 23.11[3] (2d ed. 1969).

FEDrRAL PRAC-

114. Advisory Note, supra note 67, at 105-06, refers to the cases and emphasizes
its purpose to eliminate the practice.

115. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43

F.R.D. 39, 44 (1968).
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sentation drawn from the fact that members of a common-question class
are "only loosely associated by common questions of law or fact, rather
116
than by any pre-existing or continuing legal relationship."
The right to enter an appearance is not described or defined either
in the rule itself or in the advisory committee's notes. Professor Kaplan
understood the primary benefit of such an appearance to be the right to
receive copies of papers, so as to be informed on a running basis. The
right to participate actively by introducing evidence, cross-examining witnesses, argument, and the like, would be subject to limitation by the court
under subdivision (d) (1),17 as well as subject, presumably, to the prerequisites of the intervention rule. 1 8
It is submitted that the "option out" feature of the new rule is not

justified by any characteristics peculiar to the common-question class
action. In the first place, as the courts have discovered, the privilege is
incongruous in the case of defendant classes."19 In the second place, in
the far more common plaintiff-class case, the special prerequisites of
subdivision (b) (8) would seem to provide adequate protection for any
individual interest of class members. Third, the privilege unnecessarily
increases the notice requirements, thereby increasing the potential costs
of a device that is designed to increase the efficiency of litigation. 20
Finally, the categories are too difficult to distinguish from one another
to justify the sharp distinction in treatment' 21
Wherein can the "individual interest" or "individual preference" be
supposed to consist? It would seem that a member of a plaintiff class
might wish to opt out for two reasons: either he wants to sue alone, or

he does not want to sue at all. He may want to sue alone because he
thinks he can get a better award; but this will be so only if his recovery
potential is high, because the costs to him of separate suit will inevitably
be higher, unless he expects to be able to take advantage of the pendency
of the big class suit to get a fat and early separate settlement. However,
to the extent that the case as alleged by the original class representative

indicates a potential for large individual recoveries, the court must consider this before allowing the class action in the first place. Subdivision
(b) (3) (AB) requires the court to consider, in determining whether
the class action device is superior, the extent to which individual members of the class may be interested in controlling their own lawsuit and
116. 7A C. WiuGlrr & A. MILLR, FEDaRA. PRACMCE AND PROCEDURE § 1786,
at 143 (1972), and cases therein cited.
117. Kaplan, supra note 111, at 892 n.137.
118. See note 107 supra.
119. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
120. In practice, to be sure, the federal courts have sometimes given the express
requirements of subdivision (c) (2) a liberal, not to say cavalier, interpretation. See
text accompanying notes 129-145 infra. The willingness of some courts to ignore
the requirements themselves indicates dissatisfaction, however, and some cases have
been abandoned because of the prospective costs of (c)(2) notice.
121. See pt. II, § B of this article.
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the extent to which members of the class have already become involved in
litigation. Moreover, the court has the power to limit class action treatment to particular issues, leaving others, with respect to which individual
interest is greater, to separate treatment. 122 Finally, the court has the
power, under subdivision (c) (1), to alter or amend orders certifying class
action treatment at any time before judgment, so that individual interests discovered later can be accommodated by dropping the class action
feature, or by limiting it to particular issues, or by allowing absent mem123
bers to intervene individually.
If an individual member's preference is not to sue at all, it is difficult
to imagine how this can be greatly prejudiced. If the claims are for damages, as most subdivision (b) (3) class action claims are, the reluctant
plaintiff can simply refrain from asserting his claim when the time comes
to prove up damages-a stage that most authorities agree must very frequently be separate from the disposition of the common questions.1 2 4 To
be sure, if enough class members are either indifferent or opposed to suit,
doubt would be cast on the propriety of class action treatment, 25 but this
surveying of attitude can be done in other, less automatically preclusive
ways through the use of discretionary notice under subdivision (d) (2).120
In any case, the experience to date indicates that class members seldom
opt out,' 27 and that when they do it is frequently for lack of under28
standing.'
C. Requirements of Missouri Rule 52.08(c)(2): Manner and Form of Notice
The first sentence of rule 52.08 (c) (2) reads as follows:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
122. Subdivision (c) (4); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
123. "An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before the decision on the merits." Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.08 (c) (1); FED.
R. Crv. P. 23 (c) (1).
124. See, e.g., PROP. FED. Crv. P. 23 Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69,
100 (1966); Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43
F.R.D. 39, 47 (1967); Miller, Problems in Administering Judicial Relief in Class
Actions Under FederalRule 23(b)(3), 54 F.R.D. 501, 504 (1972); Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculationin Consumer Class Actions, 70 Mxcu.
L. REv. 338, 361-63 (1971).
125. Cf. Kom v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972), in which
the court held that it was error to drop class-action treatment under subdivision
(b) (3) after responses indicating about 10 percent exclusion and 80-90 percent
inadequate" proof-of-claim forms.
126. The technique was used, for example, in Arey v. Providence Hosp. 55
F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972), an employment discrimination case maintained under
subdivision (b) (2).
127. See, e.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Travers
Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. RIv. 811, 829 (1970).
128. An amusing yet revealing collection of responses to the notice sent to
North Carolina consumers of antibiotics, the manufacturers of which were involved in the nation-wide antitrust case (see, inter alia, West Virginia v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971)) is reproduced in Sorry I Can't Attend
Your Class Action, 4 UNIv. N.C.L. RucoRD No. 3, at 4 (1971).
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shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable
under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.
The language of the rule, taken at face value, requires that every class
member whose identity and location is known or can be ascertained with
reasonable effort be given individual notice. In the great majority of
reported cases under federal rule 23 (c) (2), the courts appear to have
followed this command to the letter.129 In several instances, pursuant
to the mandate of subdivision (b) (3) (D) to consider management problems in making findings of superiority, courts have refused class action
treatment in part on the ground of difficulties in effecting the individual
notice called for by subdivision (c) (2). 130
Occasionally, however, courts have been faced with actions that they
consider otherwise appropriate for class action treatment, but in which
the giving of (c) (2) notice would be so costly and cumbersome that they
have felt compelled to compromise with the rule in order to save the
lawsuit. The most instructive example is the second United States district court decision in Risen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,31 on remand from
the Second Circuit decision that is the leading opinion for the proposition
13 2
that due process requires notice to absent class members in all cases.
Eisen is an antitrust action for treble damages against the New York
Stock Exchange and two major odd-lot brokerage firms, alleging a conspiracy among the firms to monopolize odd-lot trading and to fix the
"odd-lot differential" (special fee to odd-lot dealers in addition to regular
brokerage fee) at excessive levels. The plaintiff investor sued for himself
and all other odd-lot investors who purchased over a seven-year period.
The class was preliminarily estimated to exceed 6,000,000 persons; Judge
Tyler found that the records of the defendant firms would allow identification through reasonable effort of about 2,000,000. It was further estimated
that (c) (2) notice, including individual notice by mail to all those who
could be identified, would cost about $300,000, plus $200,000 for the cost
of processing inquiries and claims.' 3 3 The court held (1) that due
129. See, e.g., Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 38 (S.D.
Iowa 1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Battle v.
Municipal Housing Authority, 53 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Korn v. Franchard
Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Harris v. Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D.Utah 1966);
3B J. MooaR, FEDERAL PRACtiCE 23.55 n.28 (2d ed. 1969, Supp. 1972); 7A C.
WRIGnr 8 A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PRocEDuRE § 1786 n.17 (1972).
130. Lawson v. Brown, 349 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Va. 1972); Cotchett v. Avis
Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Inmates of Milwaukee County
Jail v. Petersen, 51 F.R.D. 540 (E.D. Wis. 1971); School Dist. v. Harper Se Row
Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (reconsidered after consolidation
and notice found feasible, Illinois v. Harper 8± Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp.
484 (N.D. Ill. 1969)); Eisen v. Carlisle 8 Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); revld 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
131. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
132. Eisen v. Carlisle 8 Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
133. 52 F.R.D. at 263.
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process does not require individual notice to every member of the class,
(2) that such a requirement would "amount to an insuperable tariff on
prosecution of the case", 18 4 and (5) that rule 23 (c) (2), despite its language,
did not add to the requirements of due process. The court therefore
ordered individual notice to two groups out of the 2,000,000: (1) All of
the approximately 2,000 investors who engaged in more than 10 transactions during the relevant period; and (2) 5,000 randomly selected from
the remainder "in order to insure adequate representation and to gain
more information about the nature of the class."1 a3 In addition, publication of notice was ordered in newspapers likely to reach investors, in
order to reach those who were not to receive individual notice.13 6
This interpretation of subdivision (c) (2) finds resonance in the
literature,187 and it is almost certainly consistent with the requirements
of due process in class actions generally.38s There can be scarcely any
doubt, however, that it is a strained reading of the language of the rule.
It remains to be seen whether Judge Tyler's ruling will survive appellate
review. For the moment it seems more likely to be a hard case, an extreme
situation, that would not authorize routine evasion of the rule's requirements. Eisen may well be firm precedent only where the court is
faced with truly prohibitive costs, so that relaxation of the notice requirements is the only alternative to abandonment of the action. Judge
Tyler's emphasis on the meritoriousness of the claims of the class, the
small size of the individual claims (making interest in individual litigation highly unlikely), "the strong public policy behind the antitrust laws
in general, and the fundamental role of the private treble-damage action
in enforcing those laws,"18 9 indicates the parameters of the claimed dis.
3
cretion.l oa

184. Id. at 267.

185. Id.
186. Certainly Eisen is the most dramatic example of deviation from the ex-

press notice requirements of subdivision (c) (2). Indeed, there appears to be only
one other recorded case of a notice order that deliberately refrained from individual
notice to readily identifiable members. In Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), several plaintiff classes sought damages for securities fraud; the petitions
alleged misrepresentations by a corporation and by brokers dealing in its securities that artificially inflated the market price. Four of the five classes consisted
of holders and purchasers of debentures that were converted in the relevant period
into shares of stock; the fifth consisted of purchasers of the stock itself. As to the
first four, individual notice to all identifiable purchasers was ordered. As to the
fifth class, however, the court noted that it would be difficult if not impossible to
identify all the purchasers for purposes of individual notice, and therefore ordered
no individual notice; instead, the supplementary published notice utilized for the
first four classes was expanded to include the fifth.
187. See articles cited note 72 supra.
188. See text accompanying
notes 78-78 supra.
189. 52 F.R.D. at 270.
189a. Since the text was written the Second Circuit has reversed Judge Tyler's
ruling and has ordered dismissal of the class action on grounds of manageability.
Eisen v. Carlisle &cJacquelin, ._F.2d_.,
41 U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir., May 1, 1973).
With respect to the propriety of omitting individual notice to identifiable members
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D. Requirements of Rule 52.08(c)(2): Content, Timing
and Source of Notice
Subdivision (c) (2) specifies three items that must be included in the
required notice to members of a (b) (3) class: (1) The right to request

exclusion; (2) the binding effect of the judgment if exclusion is not requested; and (3) the right to enter an appearance. The courts have not
had great difficulty with these items, and the forms of notice are set
forth in a number of reported opinions. 40 One matter has caused some
dispute, however: to what extent may the notice require some affirmative
response from the absent members, indicating a willingness to participate in the recovery and assert a claim? In a few cases, the court has
ordered notice to members of a plaintiff class that would require submission of a proof-of-claim form, or a declaration of intention to assert
a claim, within a specified period of time, on pain of being barred from
recovery.' 41 There is some advantage to be gained from the procedure, in
the form of early information as to the ultimate size of the class and
the overall exposure of the defendant. In at least one instance, the court
was noticeably bothered by the fact that the actions were brought a few
days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, and may have

wished to minimize the uncertainty occasioned by the tolling effect of
the class action.142 It would seem, however, that attaching preclusive
effect to a failure to file a proof of claim is inconsistent with the purpose
of the representative action, as well as with the terms of subdivision (c) (2).

of the class, the court simply referred to the text of the rule and to its own prior
opinion, 391 F.2d 555, 568, as requiring individual notice to readily identifiable
members, and dismissal of the class action if such notice is impossible. The court's
concern with other factors in the case, however-the minuteness of the individual
claims (S3.90 on the average), the disproportionate cost of distribution of any

award, the difficulty of reaching most class members with any notice, and doubts
as to the propriety of the treble-damage remedy vis-A-vis regulatory action-may
leave some spark of life in Judge Tyler's analysis of the notice requirements for a
case properly characterizable as extreme, meritorious, and apt for class-action treatment.
140. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Katz v.
Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Mack v. General Elec. Co., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d
799 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Bragalini v. Biblowitz, 13 Fed. Rules Ser. 2d 23b.3, Case 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
141. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 274, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Iowa v. Union Asphalt & Roadoils, Inc., 281
F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Ia. 1968); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559
(D. Minn. 1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D.
452 (E.D. Pa. 1968); cf. Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 38
(S.D. Iowa 1972), in which proofof-claim notice was postponed until a later, but
obviously still pre-trial, stage; a similar procedure was utilized in Harris v. Jones, 41
F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
142. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
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For this reason other courts utilizing the proof-of-claim form for informational purposes have expressly rejected any preclusive effect of failure to
respond.143 Once a judgment favorable to the class has been rendered,
however, and damages are to be calculated and paid, the situation is
different; then, the order to assert the claim or lose it is entirely appropriate. On the other hand a requirement that a class member exercise
the privilege of opting out within a reasonable period of time after receiving notice is clearly appropriate.1 44
The rule says nothing about the timing of notice under subdivision
(c) (2), although the determination of propriety under subdivision (c) (1)
is required to be made "as soon as practicable after commencement" of
the action. A number of courts have found it desirable to postpone the
sending of notice until pretrial proceedings (e.g., discovery) have been
completed, apparently in order to allow reconsideration of the determination of propriety after the evidence is more fully developed.1 45 The
difficulty with this approach, of course, is that it may reduce the usefulness of the absent member's privileges under the rule.1 40 Doubtless it
would be impossible to formulate a useful general rule any more precise
than the "as soon as practicable" phrase of subdivision (c) (1). Adoption
of that standard for subdivision (c) (2) would still leave room for some
delay for preliminary motions and discovery, at least where additional
information is needed in order to identify class members or to determine
whether the opposing party or the court should bear some of the costs of
147
notice.
143. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971); Arey
v. Providence Hosp., 55 F.R.D. 62 (D.D.C. 1972); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Mack
v. General Elec. Co., 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 799 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 51 F.R.D.
167 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kom v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Proofof-claim forms were rejected altogether in Abulaban v. S.W. Pressprich &cCo., 51
F.R.D. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 15 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
144. Subdivision (c) (2). See cases cited note 140 supra, in each of which the
notice contained a specification of the date on or before which requests for exclusion must be made.
145. See, e.g., Seligson v. Plum Tree, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,098 (E.D. Pa.
1972); City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 5 (D.N.J. 1971);
Cusick v. N.V. Nederlansche Combinatie voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp.
1022 (E.D. Pa. 1970); City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Fischer v.
Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); But cf. Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp.
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), which suggested that tentative or conditional class action
treatment is improper.
146. See Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 16 Fed Rules Serv. 2d 38, 56 (S.D.
Iowa 1972); 3B J. MooR,, FruR A PRa.ricE 23.55, at 23-1159 to 1160 (2d ed.
1969).
147. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), which
postponed sending notice until a preliminary hearing on the merits to decide how
to allocate the cost burden; City of Philadelphia v. Emhart Corp., 50 F.R.D. 232
(E.D. Pa. 1907). As to Eisen, now reversed in this respect, see note 161 infra.
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There has been some disagreement among the federal courts-arising
often in the context of a cost-allocation dispute, but sometimes as a
separate issue-as to the proper source of the notice. Subdivision (c) (2)
would seem to require that the notice emanate from the court: "the
court shall direct to the members of the class .
. Two reasons have
been offered for having the notice go out on official stationery or at
least over the court clerk's name: (1) A notice is more likely to be read
and heeded if it comes from a court; and (2) notice coming from a selfappointed class representative may be subject to the charge of solicitation
of business for the representative's lawyer (who is in most instances the
48
real force behind the suit).1
The first reason is persuasive, the second much less so. The solicitation
objection had great merit in the former "spurious" class action, where the
absent members of the class would not be included in the judgment
unless they intervened, and therefore the notice would be an invitation
to join and swell the total recovery. 149 Under the new rule, absent members will be included in the judgment unless they exclude themselves;
what is being solicited by the notice, therefore, is not inclusion but exclusion, or at most appearance, presumably through another attorney. The
notice protects the absent members against inadequate representation, and
thus reinforces the court in assuring that the named parties protect the
interests of those represented. In this sense it should be a communication
from the court analogous in function to the summons. So long as the
court monitors the content and language of the notice, it is difficult to
see barratry even in notice sent out over the representatives' signature.' 5 0
"..

E. Costs of Notice
A question that should be entirely independent of that of the
148. Cf. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 274, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48
F.R.D. 333, 338 (D.R.I. 1969); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301
F. Supp. 484, 494 (N.D. Ill. 1969); School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,
267 F. Supp. 1001, 1004-05 (E.D. Pa. 1967). See also 7A C. WGsrr & A. MMLER,
FFDmuL PRAcTcE An PROCEDJURE § 1788, at 164-65 (1972); Ward & Elliott, The
Contents and Mechanics of Ruld23 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. Rn.v. 557, 563-

64 (1969).
149. In Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936 (D. Mass.
1962), Judge Wyzanski denied plaintiff's motion to authorize notice to absent
members of a spurious class, on the ground that "[no precedent supports the
suggestion that the plaintiffs or their counsel have a moral duty to act as unsolicited champions of others." He was also concerned with the possible implication
in such a notice (in effect, under the old rule, an invitation to intervene) that the
court considered the claims meritorious; under the new rule courts have sometimes
included an express disclaimer of any such opinion. See, e.g., In re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 274, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1971); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 547 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
150. Cf. Ward & Elliott, supra note 148, at 561 ("The cure lies in the tenor
of the notice."); Lamb v. United Sec. Life Co., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 38, 58
(S.D. Iowa 1972); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
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purported source of the notice is the more troublesome one of who should
pay for it. A few courts have assumed that subdivision (c) (2) required
them not only to order notice but also to bear the costs.151 While this
appears not to have been a regular practice, the resulting charges of the
Post Office against the Administrative Office of the United States Courts

so alarmed the latter that it instructed the courts that the budget would
not allow such mailings. 152 It can be assumed that state court administrative budgets will be no less constricted, so that uureimbursed mailings
at court expense will be impracticable. So long as the court controls the
content, form, and manner of notice, however, and appears as the source
of the notice, there seems to be no reason in policy to require the
53
procedure to be at public expense.'
The more realistic alternatives for bearing the ultimate financial
burden of notice are the plaintiffs, the defendant(s), and the absent
members of the class, or some combination of these. Most courts and
commentators begin with the premise that the plaintiff, as the one who
requests the class action treatment, should bear the cost of (c)(2)-type
notice.154 It will frequently happen, however, especially in the case
of a plaintiff class in which the representatives' claims are relatively
small, that the cost of notice will exceed the value of the named plaintiffs'
claims. A few courts have denied class action treatment where the representatives were unable or unwilling to assume the burden, 5 5 or have
151. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
838 F. Supp. 278, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
152. Memorandum No. 562 from William R. Sweeney, Assistant Director for
Management Affairs, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, to all
United States District Judges and Clerks of United States District Courts, December 21, 1971. The memorandum explicitly mentions the antibiotic drug cases, in
which "occupant"-type mailings at court expense reached "alarming proportions."
158. Cf. Ward &Elliott, supra note 148, at 566:
[Assumption of costs by the court] would involve a misappropriation
of public funds and would tend to give the court a stake in the outcome
of the litigation. By initially bearing the cost of notice, the court would
be making it possible for one party to proceed, when it could not have
done so before. Such an action is unprecedented and inconsistent with any
pretense of judicial impartiality.
154. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 891 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Lamb V.
United Sec. Life Co., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 88 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 58 F.R.D. 589 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Cusick v. N. V. Nederlandsche
Combinatie voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Feder
v. Harrington, 52 F.R1D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D.
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Herbst
v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Richland v. Cheatham, 272 F. Supp. 148
(S.D.N.Y. 1967); 3B J. MoopR, FEDERAL PRACrCE 23.55, at 1154-55 (2d ed. 1969);
WRiGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACIcE AND PROCEDURE § 1788, at 168
(1972); Ward & Elliott, supra note 148, at 566-67; Comment, Class Actions Under
FederalRule 23(b)(3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MD. L. REv. 189, 155-56 (1969).

7A C.

155. E.g., Buford v. American Fin. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1248 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, __F.2d_,

41 U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir., May 1, 1978).
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indicated that the ability or willingness to pay for notice may be considered in determining the adequacy of representation. 156 In a number of
cases, however, the burden has been placed at least in part on the de6 7
fendant.
It is generally agreed that placing the burden of notice on the defendant requires some evaluation of the probability that the plaintiff
class will win. There is disagreement among the courts, however, on the
necessity or advisability of a preliminary evidentiary hearing on the
merits of the claims of the class. The lead was taken by Judge Weinstein
who, in Dolgow v. Anderson,'6 8 ordered an evidentiary "mini-hearing"
prior to certification of the class action as such. A preliminary hearing
on the merits prior to allocation of costs of notice was ordered in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,159 because plaintiffs, despite the dramatic reduction
in notice costs allowed by that decision (from $300,000 to something less
than $25,000), were unable to foot the bill themselves in view of the size
of their individual claims. A year later, the court found that the plaintiffs
were "more than likely to prevail at trial or upon a motion for summary
judgment," and imposed 90 percent of the costs of notice on the defendants. 160 It is clear that this procedure should be used with great
caution, because the "mini-hearing" can have a devastating effect on the
losing party's position on the merits, yet it cannot by hypothesis be the
full trial to which the party is entitled. 10 Other courts have imposed part
or all of the costs of notice on the defendant without an evidentiary hearing. In Berland v. Mack,162 a securities fraud case, the court in effect required the defendants to prepare the mailing lists and plaintiff to bear
the cost of dissemination, subject to a later allocation at the end of the
litigation. The court noted that a previous action by the SEC for injunction resulted in a finding that misleading statements had been made

("a prima facie meritorious case"), and that the defendants had an interest in maximizing the res judicata effect of the judgment
tended to move for partial summary judgment themselves), as
imposition of some costs on the defendants. That the costs
inordinately high in relation to the total estimated damages,

(they injustifying
were not
and that

156. Cf. Cusick v. N. V. Nederlandsche Combinatie voor Chemische Industrie,
317 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
157. Bragalini v. Biblowitz, 13 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 23b.3, Case 8 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); 7A C. WRIGHT &cA. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1788, at
168-70 (1972). The Second Circuit's latest opinion in Eisen does not exclude this
possibility in a proper case. See __F.2d___ n.5.
158. 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
159. 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
160. Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
161. The Second Circuit has now disapproved this practice in unequivocal
terms (see Eisen v. Carlisle &-Jacquelin, __F.2d_, 41 U.S.L.W. 2586 (2d Cir.,
May 1, 1973)), although it also noted that the mini-hearing ordered in that case
exceeded the trial judge's limited mandate on remand from an earlier appellate
decision. See also Miller v. Mackey Internat'l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 1971).
162. 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the named plaintiffs were themselves numerous and not indigent, justified
imposing the remainder of the costs on the plaintiffs. 10 3
There appears to be little precedent in Missouri law for the handling
of costs of notice in class actions, inasmuch as the problem has not yet
arisen. There is no reason to doubt, however, that the recognized discretionary power of the court in assessing costs in civil actions would suffice to allow the imposition of the initial expense of notice in a proper
case in whole or in part on the defendant. 0 4 In the case of consumer
actions, e.g., credit-card holders suing issuers for violation of the Truthin-Lending Act,16 5 the defendant will frequently be in regular communication with the potential class members, so that dissemination of the notice can
be accomplished without great additional expense.
IV. EFFECr OF JUDGMENT

A. Judgment Unfavorable to the Class
The fundamental principle adopted in the new class action rule is
that a judgment will include all members of the class, whether the
judgment is favorable or not.160 The rule also requires that the judgment
identify at least by description those who are members of the class. The
ultimate test of res judicata effect, however-collateral attack in a subsequent proceeding-has seldom been faced by a class action judgment, 107
so that little direct authority is available. The reasons for this are no
doubt many: Courts probably incline, in cases that appear to be of questionable merit, to deny class action treatment before dismissing or granting
summary judgment; once an action is ruled proper under subdivision

(c) (1), the pressure on the opponent to settle rather than litigate to the
end will very frequently prove too great; and by the time a final determination on the merits of a certified class action is made, the statute of

163. Id. at 132-33.
164. The equitable origins of the class action have been recognized in Missouri. See Crawford, Class Actions Under the Missouri Code, 18 U.K.C.L. Rav. 103,
103-04 (1950). The cases recognize an inherent discretionary power of courts of
equity to apportion costs among the parties provisionally as well as finally. See
Gieselmann v. Stegeman, 470 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Mo. 1910) (allocation of costs of
receivership pendente lite among defendants in stockholders' suit); Schwartz v.
Shelby Constr. Co., 338 S.W.2d 781, 794 (Mo. 1960); Sitzes v. Raidt, 35 S.W.2d 690
(Spr. Mo. App. 1960); Amitin v. Izard, 262 S.W.2d 353, 356 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953).
The Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure afford some analogous instances of interlocutory costs award, such as Mo. R. Civ. P. 77.07 (Costs on Motions). It may be
doubted, further, whether an order requiring a party to effect notice at his expense
need be regarded as an award of costs as such.
165. Cf. Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 546-47 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
166. Subdivision (c) (3).
167. Cf. notes 80-98 and accompanying text supra.
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limitations on any separate action that might be brought by an absent
168

member will usually have run.
For whatever reason, it is likely that collateral attack on a judgment
unfavorable to a class-especially a plaintiff class-will continue to be a
rare bird indeed. Nonetheless, so long as the doctrine of mutuality remains
alive, the res judicata effect of an unfavorable judgment will be a crucial
factor in the somewhat more probable collateral attack on a judgment
favorable to the class. 169 We start, therefore, -ith the more remote possibility. The discussion centers around three defenses: Lack of jurisdiction in the "minimum contacts" sense; insufficient notice; and inadequate representation.

1. Lack of Jurisdiction
Although the decided cases are sparse and the critical literature scarcely
lush, there is agreement that the formal acquisition of personal jurisdiction over all class members-even in the case of a defendant class-is not
70
required in order to support a judgment that binds absent members.'
It is sufficient that members of the class qualified by interest and typicality
to represent the entire group be brought within the court's jurisdiction.
This is a necessary consequence of the class action's function of dealing
with cases in which all proper or necessary parties cannot be formally
joined because of their numbers. It does not follow, however, that
persons not otherwise subject to the court's jurisdiction may constitutionally
be bound by a judgment unfavorable to the class. On the contrary, there
is no reason to suppose that the usual territorial limitations on state
judicial power are inapplicable to class actions. 171 In the case of commonquestion class actions, subdivision (b) (3) (C) also expressly enjoins the
court to consider the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the
particular forum.
The extent to which a court may reach nonresidents in class actions
should be dictated by the state's interest in obtaining a unitary adjudica168. The impact of pendency of a class action on the running of the statute
of limitations against an absent member is uncertain. Cf. Philadelphia Elec. Co.
v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 460-61 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
169. It may be supposed that collateral attack even on a judgment favorable to
the class is so unlikely as to make the weaknesses of the rule relatively insignificant.
In the usual common-question case the relief sought will be damages, and the
distribution of damages to absentees will usually be administered in the main
action itself, so that it is unlikely that an absentee will need to institute a subsequent proceeding in order to obtain his individual recovery. The fact remains,
however, that because of the imperfections of notice absentees will not always
know about the lawsuit until it is over, and there is no assurance that attempts by
the court to foreclose late claims will be binding on unnotified absentees.
170. See 7A C. Wiaoirr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PRocEDURE § 1757
(1972); Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 COLmi. L. REv.
609, 645 (1971).

171. For excellent analysis, see Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court
Class Action Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18
U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 1002, 1008-12, esp. 1011 (1971).
HeinOnline -- 38 Mo. L. Rev. 209 1973

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

don. The Supreme Court's decisions have recognized some power in the
state courts to bind nonresidents, particularly in cases involving common

funds effectively located in the state or the internal organization of
associations formed under the laws of the adjudicating state. In Hartford
Life Insurance Co. v. Ibs 7 2 a Connecticut state court had upheld assessments by a Connecticut company's mutual insurance fund against a
challenge, brought by participants as representatives of all participants
in many states, on the ground that the company could not assess the
members to reimburse payment of benefits so long as the current balance
was sufficient to pay all current claims. A Minnesota state court, in a suit
brought by the widow of a Minnesota participant for death benefits, rejected the company's defense of cancellation for non-payment of assessments. The United States Supreme Court held that the Connecticut
court's judgment was binding on the Minnesota participant, who was
not a formal party to the action and had not been served or notified. 78
In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble1 4 a federal court in Indiana,
basing its jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, had rendered a judgment
for the defendant fraternal benefit society (organized under Indiana law)
in an action brought by nonresident certificate holders on behalf of
themselves and all other holders of the same class of certificates, challenging the propriety of a proposed reorganization of the society. Thereafter a second action was brought in an Indiana state court by resident
certificate holders, and the society sought an injunction from the federal
court prohibiting such relitigation of the issues that it had already decided.
The Supreme Court held that the injunction should have issued be-

cause the judgment bound the entire class, including both resident and
nonresident absentees. In these cases the Court emphasized the need for

unitary adjudication of rights to common funds, and the power of a
state court to decide issues concerning the internal structure of companies
organized under the laws of that state.
Mullane and Hansberry are both consistent with this analysis, although Mullane did not involve class action treatment and the Hansberry
judgment was denied class action effect. Mullane involved the legal incidents of a common trust fund operated by a New York bank under
New York law;' 75 Hansberry involved the validity of contractual restric76
tions on the sale of property located in fllinois.

172. 237 U.S. 662 (1915).
173. In Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S. 146 (1917), the Missouri
courts were required to recognize the same judgment that was involved in lbs.
See also Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66
(1938); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915);
Carpenter v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 2d 307, 74 P.2d 761 (1937), afrd
sub nom. Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938).
174. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
175. See notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra.
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The federal courts have been relatively untroubled by the inclusion
of nonresidents in classes represented before them, although federal courts
are, in the absence of statute, generally limited in territorial reach of
personal jurisdiction to the state in which they sit.1 77 The overwhelming
majority of federal court class actions arise under federal laws that evince
strong public policy;' 7 8 some, such as the antitrust laws'1 9 and the securities laws,' 8 0 expressly provide for nationwide service of process. The
federal cases are consistent, therefore, with a requirement that the forum
have a governmental interest in a unitary adjudication including nonresidents.
To the extent that the common-question class action is justified
primarily by judicial economy, it is relevant to inquire whether the forum
state itself has an interest in promoting such economy strong enough to
justify adjudicating the claims of nonresidents. If the separate litigation
that would be avoided by class action treatment would be brought in
other states, the forum's interest is doubtful. By contrast the federal
system is a unitary one, so that the avoidance of separate litigation in other
federal districts is in the interest of the entire system.
On this analysis the nationwide consumer class action brought in a
state court, such as Reardon v. Ford Motor Co.,' 8 ' would present substantial difficulties in the case of a judgment unfavorable to the class. It
would strain the concept to find a state interest in adjudicating claims
of nonresidents to be governed in part by the laws of another state, where
the nonresidents have no contact with the state, merely because the claims
have issues in common with claims asserted by residents. If the presence
of the nonresidents as members of the class was essential to the vindication of the residents' claims-if the class would otherwise not be large
enough to justify class action treatment or to make litigation economically
feasible-a case might be made, so long as another forum was not more
appropriate. Conceivably the fact that the opponent's wrongful conduct
(e.g., improper assembly) took place in the state would provide a basis
for jurisdiction to adjudicate nonresidents' claims; perhaps the state's
interest in providing a single forum for the adjudication of claims against
a domestic enterprise would also suffice.' 8 2 There is no direct precedent
for such power, however, and decisions like Hanson v. Denckla, 83 in

177. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (f); 4 C. WRIGHT &A.
1124 (1969).

MILLER,FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PRoCEDURE §

178. Antitrust, securities regulation, and civil rights cases are the most frequent. See notes 29-36, 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) (applicable to corporations only).
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v (a), 78aa (1970).
181. 7 Ill. App. 3d 338, 287 N.E.2d 519 (1972); see text accompanying note

35 supra.
182. See Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in The Federal
Courts, 71 HARV.L. Rxv. 874, 940 (1958).
183. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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which jurisdiction over a nonresident trustee based on the economic
impact of disposition of the funds on primarily resident beneficiaries
was held insufficient, suggest that connections sufficient for choice-of-law
purposes may not be enough to support personal jurisdiction.
It has been suggested that individual notice to a nonresident, pursuant
to subdivision (c) (2), giving him the option to remove himself from the
class, might obviate territorial jurisdictional objections.18 4 This misses
the point. Notice is a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction already inherent in the relationship of the subject matter or the parties to the forum,
not a substitute for such a relationship. Despite the recent expansion of
territorial jurisdiction under the long-arm statutes, a state still almost
certainly lacks power to adjudicate the rights of persons with whom "the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations."' 8a 5 To impose on a nonresident,
over whom the state otherwise has no jurisdiction, a duty affirmatively
to remove himself from the class or waive any objection to adverse judgment would itself constitute an exercise of non-existent power.' 80
2. Inadequate Notice
As we have seen,' 87 the authorities are unclear on the question of
notice as a due process requirement. It appears, however, that in the
ordinary class action there is no constitutional requirement that all absent
members receive notice. If the mandate of subdivision (c) (2) is met, with
individual notice going to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort, the judgment should be binding on absentees even if
they did not receive actual notice, if the forum has a sufficiently strong
interest in unitary adjudication of the claims or defenses of the class.

The difficulty, however, is that in the case of the common-question
class action the rule gives the absentee the privilege of frustrating the
state's interest in unitary adjudication. His right to remove himself from
the class, although subject to reasonable time limitation, is arbitrary and
unconditional. Even the most formal and effective notice, therefore, cannot serve to force the unwilling absentee to submit to adjudication as a
class member; the privilege can be evaded only by withholding notice
so that the absentee never knows his interests are the subject of litigation.

This is, to say the least, an anomalous situation, and it is difficult to
square with fundamental fairness. The anomaly is all the greater, of
course, where (as in Eisen) the court deliberately refrains from notifying
readily locatable members of the class, in order to save costs.' 88 Then it
184. School Dist. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1001, 1005
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
185. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
186. Clearly, an ordinary defendant cannot be required to present his jurisdictional objection to the court on pain of waiver on collateral attack, See De.
velopments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. REV. 909, 991 (1960).
187. See pt. III, § A of this article.
188. See text accompanying notes 131-139 supra.
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cannot be said that the court and the parties have done all that could

be done to protect the absentees' interests as defined by the rule. Having given the absentee an unconditional right to insist on separate
litigation, the court can scarcely say that the state's interest in unitary

adjudication forecloses exercise of that right by an unnotified absentee
in a subsequent proceeding.
It is arguable, then, that even the best notice practicable in a com-

mon-question class action will not suffice to prevent unnotified members
of the class from relitigating issues decided against the class. There is
no doubt that the draftsmen of the rule intended otherwise; but the
result-a judgment binding only upon members who receive actual notice
and fail to withdraw-would be one quite comparable to the "permissive
joinder device" with which the federal courts lived (however uncomfortably) for 28 years under the former rule. That the result is unnecessary,
in that the privilege to opt out does not appear to be required by due
process,' 8 9 might be expected to lead the court in the subsequent proceeding to give res judicata effect to the prior judgment at least where
the "best notice practicable" has been given, reading that clause as
qualifying the clause giving the right to opt out. It is difficult to see,
however, how a deliberate failure to notify can be overlooked.
3. Inadequate Representation
Nothing has happened since 1940 to qualify the holding of Hansberry
v. Lee' 90 that an absent member of a purported class cannot be bound
by a judgment against the class if the absentee's interests were inadequately
represented. Just as a lack of personal jurisdiction over a formal party
defendant forms a basis for collateral attack, so must inadequate representation invalidate a judgment against an absentee class member. 9 1
It may be open to question, on the other hand, whether an absentee
who receives notice in a common-question class action, but fails to exercise his right to make an appearance or to object to the representation,
thereby waives his right to attack the judgment collaterally on that basis.
No reported decision on point appears, but the few commentators assume
that a finding of waiver would be inappropriate. 92 The waiver would
apparently consist of neglect of a duty to speak up if the procedures
adopted are unfair, so that they may be corrected before judgment is
rendered. That could justify at most a waiver of grounds for attack known
to the absentee prior to judgment; it is unlikely that most grounds for
asserting inadequate representation would be known to the absentee who
does not intervene.
189. See text accompanying notes 119-128 supra.
190. 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
191. See authorities cited note 72 supra.
192. Homburger, supra note 170, at 646; Comment, Can Due Process be Satisfied by Discretionary Notice in Federal Class Actions?, 4 CEIGHTON L. Rtv. 268,

299 (1971).
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B. Judgment Favorable to the Class
1. The Doctrine of Mutality

According to the traditional doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, one
who would not have been bound by an unfavorable judgment in a prior
proceeding may not in a subsequent litigation invoke a favorable judg-

ment, even against a party to that first proceeding who was otherwise
bound by it.19s Under that principle, an absent member of a class who
did not receive adequate notice or who was not adequately represented,
and who therefore would not have been bound by a judgment unfavorable
to the class, may not in a subsequent lawsuit rely on a favorable judg-

ment against the opponent of the class. In view of the substantial uncertainties regarding the res judicata effect of unfavorable judgments under
the new class action rule, the doctrine of mutuality poses a potential threat
to the general usefulness of the device.
The only decided cases in the federal courts under the new rule
are those in the Gregory sequence, 194 in which two circuits held that in
a class action in which no notice was given to absentees, a judgment
favorable to the class had no class action effect. 95 In addition, two district courts denied res judicata effect expressly on the mutuality ground,
although their decisions were affirmed on purely jurisdictional grounds. 100
The extent to which the doctrine of mutuality survives in the federal
courts is open to question, however, in view of a substantial trend in
state and lower federal decisions away from the doctrine, and the Supreme
Court's rejection of mutuality (at least for patent cases) in Blonder19 7
Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.
The status of the mutuality doctrine in Missouri state courts is not
entirely clear, despite very recent dicta to the effect that mutuality is
the law of the state. 9 8s Recent holdings of the state supreme court to
that effect appear not to have been fully argued,199 while a more exten193. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111,
127 (1912); RESTA'ErNT OF JUDGMENTS § 93, comment d at 463 (1942); F. JAMES,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.31 (1965); M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 215-224 (1972).

194. See notes 84-97 and accompanying text supra.
195. Schrader v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. #76, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972); Zeilstra v. Tarr, 466 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1972).
196. McCarthy v. Director of Selective Serv., 322 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Wis.
1970), aff'd 460 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1972); Pasquier v. Tar, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.
La. 1970), aff'd 444 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1971).
197. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See Comment, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of Illinois Foundation: Mutuality of Estoppel-A Final Eulogy, 5
IND. LEGAL F. 208 (1971); lower federal court decisions cited in the Blonder
opinion, 402 U.S. at 825 n.13.
198. See Feinstein v. Edward Livingston & Sons, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 789, 794
(Mo. 1970): "[I]t is settled law in Missouri that '.

.

. estoppel by judgment must

be mutual and bind both parties. If the judgment is not binding on both, it
binds neither.'"
199. In Marusic v. Union Elec. Co., 377 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. 1964), a husband
sued for loss of services and expenses resulting from his wife's injury allegedly
HeinOnline -- 38 Mo. L. Rev. 214 1973

19731

COMMON-QUESTION CLASS ACTION

sively reasoned opinion of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in 1966200
indicates agreement with the trend away from mutuality noted below.
In any event the issue has never arisen in a class action context, largely
because of the effect of former rule 52.09 (d). It is clear that it would
require some departure from the traditional doctrine to allow the absent
member of a victorious class to enforce the judgment against the opponent
despite the absence of procedural safeguards intended for the protection
of absentees.
2. Recent Trends

Since 1942, when Judge Traynor wrote the opinion in Bernhard v.

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,201 there has been
a growing trend toward abolishing the doctrine of mutuality. The argument is that so long as the party against whom the prior judgment is
invoked has had his day in court on the relevant issues, it should not
matter that the person invoking the judgment was not a party and was
not bound.2 02 The class action situation would be a good place to begin
relaxing the rule, at least where the grounds upon which the absentee
could have challenged an unfavorable judgment were technical and peculiar to class members (e.g., lack of notice and inadequate representation)
and could not be said to affect the full trial of the issues. The policy
of eliminating unnecessary repetition of litigation, which lies behind
the principle of res judicata and which justifies relaxation of mutuality,
is surely as important in the class action situation as in any other.
V. SoMm PRoPosAs FOR REF Rm
A number of proposals for further modification of the federal class
action rule, and a few aimed at state court adoption of modernized rules
on the federal pattern, have appeared in the literature. Those with which
we are concerned here have focused on two trouble spots: (1) The differential treatment called for in the current rule in view of the difficulty
of distinguishing between the categories; and (2) the special privileges
of option out or appearance accorded to absentees in common-question
cases.

caused by the defendant, after his wife had recovered a judgment from the defendant for her own damages. The supreme court in the husband's case, after
holding that the husband had failed to make a submissible case and therefore
could not complain of a verdict and judgment for the defendant, dismissed the
finding of negligence in the wife's case in a concluding paragraph as simply
"not res judicata of the issues in this case." Id. at 459.
200. In re Estate of Laspy, 409 S.W.2d 725, 736-37 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966). See
also Arata v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 351 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. 1961).
201. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
202. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S. 2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195
(1967); F. JAMES, CIViL PROCEDUR § 11.34 (1965); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044,
1067 (1970); Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALiF. L. RFv. 25
(1965).
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A. Reforming the Categories
There are essentially two directions that a reform of the categories
can take: Adoption of a single definition of the proper class action; and
elimination of the differences in treatment. Because it has been said
that every case that satisfies the requirements of subdivisions (b)(1) or
(b) (2) will almost certainly satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b) (3),
the most comprehensive proposal for a state-court class action rule, that
of Professor Homburger, 203 adopts the (b) (3) definition as the universal
one. The extension of the "predominance" and "superiority" criteria of
subdivision (b) (8) to all class actions is only an apparent alteration of
requirements, because they will be met in any case in which the relief
sought will be unitary and affect the entire class, or in which separate
litigation may produce results that either are anomalous or affect unrepresented persons.
The main argument in favor of retaining the present rule's categories
but eliminating the differentiation in treatment is that by providing
functional definitions of typical cases the rule makes it easier to identify
204
the proper class action. Professor Homburger thinks that is illusory,
but other commentators disagree.20 5 Probably even the functional definitions of the new rule are too abstract for precedential use; in applying
the rule, courts and lawyers are likely to rely more on secondary works
that list the proper cases in more detailed and descriptive terms ("common funds," "cases involving the validity of bond issues," "numerous
similar claims for damages").20 6 Nonetheless, if all proper class actions
are subject to the same rules, retaining the present categories would do
no harm.
B. Reforming Subdivision (c)(2)
1. Exclusion
The heart of the difficulty in the rule, the feature that justifies the
more rigorous notice requirement for common-question class actions, is
the arbitrary right of exclusion, the right to "opt out." Various ways of
modifying the right have been proposed; one might reasonably eliminate
altogether the possibility of exclusion, 20 7 but most commentators would
retain it in the discretion of the court.20 8 It seems likely that the power
to define the class under subdivisions (c) (1), (c) (8), and (c) (4) inevitably

203. Homburger, supra note 170, at 655-57.
204. Id. at 653-54.
205. Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and
New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. Ruv. 509, 530 (1967);
Note, Proposed Rule 23: ClassActions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 650 (1965).
206. See, e.g., PRoP. FE. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D.

69, 98 (1966).

207. See text accompanying notes 119-128 supra.
208. See authorities cited notes 203 &205 supra.
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includes the power to exclude individuals for proper reasons; 209 therefore,
the latter view is the more realistic. The 1964 preliminary draft of the federal rules by the federal advisory committee called for exclusion upon
request unless the court found inclusion essential; the better approach,
however, would be to leave to the court's discretion whether to allow
exclusion at all.2 10 Exclusion would likely be appropriate only in the
case of a legitimate interest in separate litigation by a member of a
plaintiff class, and then only when the interest is particularly strong and
peculiar to one member or at most a small portion of the class. In any
case there is no reason to limit the possibility of exclusion to any one
category of class actions.
2. Notice
Eliminating the arbitrary right of exclusion eliminates any reason
for the rule to require full Mullane-type notice for all common-question
class actions. The best approach is to adopt a flexible provision, with
no differentiation between categories, that will enable the court to adapt
the coverage of the notice to the particular needs of the case. Professor
Homburger would require "reasonable notice" unless the court dispenses
with it;211 it seems preferable to make it dear that notice can be dispensed with altogether only under highly unusual circumstances. Probably
the general standard of current subdivision (c) (2) ("the best notice
practicable under the circumstances") would be too strong; in any case,
the attempt to define when "individual notice" must be given should
be eliminated, and a non-exclusive list of items should be included that
the notice may contain when appropriate,such as a right to appearance
or a request for an informational statement of claim.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article has argued that the federal class action rule and the
new Missouri rule patterned after it are likely to prove unsatisfactory as
formulated. The argument focused on the differential treatment given
209. Cf. Note, Revised Federal Rule 23 Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties
and New Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REV. 509, 525 n.68
(1967).
210. Cf. Homburger, supra note 170, at 656: "When appropriate the court may
limit the class to those members who do not request exclusion from the class
within a specified time after notice."
Tim Ai C Ic COLLEE OF TRIL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RzECO MiENDATIONS
or

THE SPECIAL COiMrrrr_

ON Ru.E 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

31-33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as REPORT], would restrict the court to two options:
Either exclusion unless inclusion is requested; or inclusion unless exclusion is requested. As now, the options would be available only under (b) (3). The difficulty
is that both options leave the wholly arbitrary decision in the hands of the
absentee, without regard to the possibility that even in common-question class
actions the court or the parties may have a legitimate interest in unitary adjudication.
211. Homburger, supra note 170, at 656.
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to common-question cases in subdivision (c)(2); that provision requires,
in many cases, more burdensome notice than is constitutionally necessary,
and allows the absentee to frustrate the purpose of the class action by
"sopting out." Much of the published criticism of the federal rule, of
course, is aimed at a more general problem that would by no means be
cured merely by amending subdivision (c) (2): i.e., the increasing administrative burden imposed on the courts by painfully slow-gaited class
actions. The number of claims involved, the size of the opponent's potential exposure, and perhaps also the dilatory ingenuity of lawyers create

the burden.2 12 It may well be that further experience with the class
action rule, at the state level as well as at the federal level, will dictate
the use of some other device for serving the same need that will substantially restrict the availability of the courts for the handling of mass
disputes. Certainly there has not been enough testing of the courts' performance to allow for confident reformation of the rule on that scale.2 18
A class action rule free of unnecessary self-contradictions and needlessly
burdensome requirements would be of great benefit. It is suggested, therefore, as a step in that direction, that subdivision (c) (2) of the new class
action rule be amended in the following manner:
(2) Notice. As soon as practicable after the court has determined
pursuant to subdivision (c) (1) that the action is to be maintained
as a class action, appropriate notice shall be directed to the members of the class, with such form, content and manner of distribution as the court shall approve. The notice shall issue in the name
of the court. The expenses of preparing and distributing such
notice shall be borne by the party requesting class action treatment, unless the court in the interest of justice directs otherwise,
subject in any case to taxation as costs. If appropriate, the notice
may (1) provide an opportunity for members to request exclusion
from the class, (2) provide an opportunity for members to make
an appearance through counsel, (3) include a request that members of the class inform the court of the nature and extent of
their claims.

212. See, e.g., R:EPoRT, supra note 210, passim; Katarincic 8: McClain, Federal
Class Actions under Rule 23: How to Improve the Merits of Your Action Without Improving the Merits of Your Claim, 33 U. PiTr. L. REV. 429 (1972); Simon,
Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972); Note,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: Frankenstein Monster Posing as a Class Action?,

33 U. Prrr. L. REv. 868 (1972).
213. Virtually no class action brought under FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (b) (5) since
1966 has yet been tried to a fully litigated judgment, REPORT, supra note 210, at
15-16; Simon, supra note 212, at 378. It is of course a point of criticism, but it
also indicates that the experiment cannot yet be evaluated.
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